A survivability assessment of the transformable craft in an operational environment by Bodden, Huntley J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2010-06
A survivability assessment of the transformable craft
in an operational environment
Bodden, Huntley J.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
A SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT OF THE 









Thesis Advisor:                                                  Gary E. Horne  
Second Reader:                                                  Thomas W. Lucas 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2010 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
A Survivability Assessment of the Transformable Craft in an Operational 
Environment 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Huntley J. Bodden 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ________________.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Seabasing is developing as a dominant concept for military operations in the 21st century and will be at the core of 
joint operations abroad. To enable an effective seabase, the Office of Naval research is leading an effort to design and 
develop a seabase connector known as the Transformable Craft (T-Craft). The T-Craft is intended to provide “game 
changing capabilities” for seabasing operations—substantially outperforming any seabase connector in the Navy’s 
current inventory. Through the use of simulation, state-of-the-art design of experiments, and advanced data analysis, 
this research modeled and analyzed over 430,000 seabasing missions by varying the number of T-Craft, their 
capabilities (e.g., speed), the types of weapon systems carried, tactics, escort mixes, and threat level in order to 
determine which combinations obtain the highest survivability and throughput rate for the T-Craft. As a result of the 
research and analysis, the following were found: (1) the presence of escorts (at least two LCS in the scenarios we 
examined) is critical when a threat exists; (2) the operating speed of the T-Craft must be determined by the operating 
capabilities of the escorts; and (3) the shoreline threat remains a critical area in ensuring T-Craft survivability.  
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
118 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Transformable Craft, T-Craft, Sea base, Sea base Connector 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
A SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSFORMABLE CRAFT IN 
AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Huntley J. Bodden 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., University of Florida 
M.S., University of Maryland University College 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Robert F. Dell 
Chairman, Department of Operations Research 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Seabasing is developing as a dominant concept for military operations in the 21st century 
and will be at the core of joint operations abroad. To enable an effective seabase, the 
Office of Naval research is leading an effort to design and develop a seabase connector 
known as the Transformable Craft (T-Craft).  The T-Craft is intended to provide “game 
changing capabilities” for seabasing operations—substantially outperforming any seabase 
connector in the Navy’s current inventory. Through the use of simulation, state-of-the-art 
design of experiments, and advanced data analysis, this research modeled and analyzed 
over 430,000 seabasing missions by varying the number of T-Craft, their capabilities 
(e.g., speed), the types of weapon systems carried, tactics, escort mixes, and threat level 
in order to determine which combinations obtain the highest survivability and throughput 
rate for the T-Craft. As a result of the research and analysis, the following were found: 
(1) the presence of escorts (at least two LCS in the scenarios we examined) is critical 
when a threat exists; (2) the operating speed of the T-Craft must be determined by the 
operating capabilities of the escorts; and (3) the shoreline threat remains a critical area in 
ensuring T-Craft survivability.  
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within 
the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logical 
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Seabasing is the future of joint operations abroad. However, without sufficient supporting 
craft, the seabase concept will be ineffective in accelerating the deployment of forces and 
sustainment ashore. To that end, in August of 2005, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) 
issued Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) 05-020 with the intent of developing an 
innovative naval prototype (INP) that would have a “game changing” impact on 
seabasing. Specifically, this BAA is focused on the seabase connector Transformable 
Craft (T-Craft). The purpose of the INP program’s T-Craft concept is to establish a ship 
that is capable of performing the arduous chore of transferring cargo at sea in sea states 
well above the current operating threshold of sea state 2. 
 This innovative basing plan eliminates the need to control hostile ports or 
airfields. It also allows greater flexibility when operating in countries that do not have the 
necessary infrastructure at ports or airfields for conducting military operations. The 
seabasing concept expands upon the concepts of Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
(OMFTS) and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM), where storming a heavily defended 
beachhead is no longer the objective. All of these initiatives move the maneuver area into 
the ocean, giving combatant commanders the capability to maneuver combat elements 
under the concealment of the horizon.  
 This research provides the Office of Naval Research and the U.S. Marine Corps 
with analytical support for operational performance requirements, which will hopefully 
aide in design determinations and influence concept of operations and employment 
methods. This thesis is guided by two questions: 
• Does the T-Craft need an organic self-defense capability? 
• How should the T-Craft be employed when a threat exists? 
 These questions are addressed using simulation, data farming techniques, and data 
analysis. In addition to providing insight into these questions, this thesis provides a 




this project or related topics. The intent of this thesis is to provide analytic support to 
determine the best configuration of an employed T-Craft in order to complete a mission 
conducted in a region where complex threats exist. 
 In order to accurately address the questions driving this research, two previously 
developed scenarios are used in this thesis. These scenarios were developed in other 
studies pertaining to the T-Craft and focus mainly on the concept of logistic support and 
sustainment for ongoing operations. For the purpose of this thesis, those same scenarios, 
slightly modified, are used to assess the threat environment and develop some 
suggestions on how to properly protect the T-Craft as it conducts its mission. The first 
scenario is a peacekeeping and peace enforcement operation that takes place in 
Colombia, South America. The second scenario takes place in Malaysia, where a regional 
conflict has developed. In both of these scenarios, the T-Craft is conducting follow-on 
sustainment operations in an environment where multiple threats exist. Along with the 
threat, escorts and weapons are varied in each scenario to see how the changes affect T-
Craft survivability and throughput.  
 This thesis uses an agent-based distillation, which is a type of computer 
simulation that attempts to capture the critical factors of interest in combat without 
explicitly modeling all of the physical details. A low resolution, agent-based simulation 
tool is used to simulate a set of approved scenarios for the T-Craft. Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata (MANA), developed by New Zealand’s Defense Technology Agency 
(DTA), is used to implement the scenarios. This research uses a technique called data 
farming, which produces large numbers of data points through the use of high 
performance computing. This process allows numerous variables (i.e., number of T-Craft, 
numbers of LCSs, number of patrol boats, and probabilities of kill for weapon systems) to 
be analyzed over broad ranges, providing insight into a large number of possible 
outcomes. Through this technique over 430,000 T-Craft missions were simulated, 
205,200 of which are used to produce the research data. These simulated operations were 
conducted in little time, and would have been time consuming and costly if conducted in 
real life. Figure S1 shows a snapshot of both the Colombia and Malaysia scenarios. 
 xxiii
 
Figure S1.  MANA screen shot of both scenarios. 
 
Each question is addressed and explored through data analysis. As a result of the 
analysis, additional insights were gained. The additional findings are one of the main 
characteristics of data farming. So much information was varied and run through the 
models that in looking for one data point, several more nuggets of information were 
discovered. This information proved to be useful and relevant, especially in 
understanding the significance of shoreline threats of semi-submersibles and swarm craft, 
and the relationship between the T-Craft and speed. The analysis of the questions 
provided the following model generated insights: 
• Organic weapons increase the survivability of the T-Craft. 
• If escorts aren’t present, the T-Craft should utilize the tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTP) of return to the seabase when a threat is present. 
• The presence of escorts significantly improves the survivability of the T-
Craft and the number of T-Craft ashore.   
• The T-Craft being armed and having escorts present improves the T-Craft 
survival rate and number of T-Craft ashore. 
• When a threat is present, T-Craft speed has a negative correlation with 
survivability. As speed increases, survivability decreases. Thus, the T-
Craft should not travel faster than the escorts.   
• A security gap was discovered along the shoreline. In both scenarios the 
enemy threat along the shoreline has a significant effect on both T-Craft 
survivability and the number of T-Craft ashore. 
• Improving the sensors and communication links on the T-Craft will 
improve the survivability of the T-Craft. 
• The LCS needs to stay with the T-Craft rather than pursue distant enemies.   
 xxiv
Upon completion of the simulation experiments and data analysis, the results of 
this study support the following recommendation for the two scenarios modeled: 
• The T-Craft should have an organic weapons system. 
• The recommended T-Craft and escort mix for the scenario with a surface 
and subsurface threat is 10 T-Craft, two LCS_SW, three LCS_ASW, and 
five MH-60s.  
• The recommended escort mix for the scenario with a pure surface threat is 
seven T-Craft, two LCS_SW, one LCS_ASW, and five MH-60s. 
• The recommended T-Craft speed is dependent on the escorts being used; 
for these scenarios the recommended range is between 20 and 30 knots. 
 This thesis provides analytic support for arming the T-Craft and gives insights into 
a mix of escorts based on the region and threat. The end product is information that can 
be used by decision-makers in developing policies, concepts of operations (CONOPS), 





1. The Office of Naval Research Broad Agency Announcement   
Over the last several years, U.S. armed forces have conducted combat operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, brought humanitarian aid and relief to hundreds of thousands 
affected by the earthquake in Haiti, and evacuated American citizens from Lebanon in the 
largest non-combatant evacuation since the fall of Vietnam (Conway, 2006). As a joint 
force, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force continually work to shape and 
prepare current and future force structures in order to meet projected threats. To that end, 
in August 2005, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) issued a Broad Agency 
Announcement (BAA) 05-020 with the intent of developing an innovative naval 
prototype (INP) that would have a “game changing” impact on seabasing. Specifically, 
this BAA is focused on the seabase connector Transformable Craft (T-Craft) prototype 
demonstrator. The purpose of the INP program’s T-Craft concept is to establish that a 
ship is capable of performing the difficult task of transferring cargo at sea in sea states 
well above the current operating threshold of sea state 2. In addition, this ship will 
demonstrate the ability to transform into an amphibious vessel capable of delivering 
cargo feet-dry above the high water mark of a beach (Wilson, 2005). 
2. Seabasing Defined  
Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, 
reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea (DoD, 2005). In 
addition, the seabase has the capability to provide continuous support, sustainment, and 
force projection to joint expeditionary forces without reliance on land bases or ports. The 
seabase is in essence a maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed networked 
platforms that enables the global power projection of offensive and defensive forces from 
the sea (CNO, 2006). Figure 1 shows the principles of seabasing. 
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Figure 1.   The principles of seabasing. (From DoD, 2005) 
Under this concept, the ideal base of operations will be established between 150 
and 200 nautical miles (nm) off the coast of a Joint Operations Area (JOA) (CNO, 2006). 
The seabase may consist of several different ship configurations based on the type of 
operation being conducted, the requests of the joint force commander, or the availability 
of assets within the region of conflict. The seabase may include some of the following: 
Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG), Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), Surface Strike Groups (SSG), combat 
logistics forces, amphibious forces, Army afloat program ships, coalition forces, and 
maritime prepositioning ships (CNO, 2006). The ultimate goal of the seabase is to 
tactically and logistically support a brigade-size (or larger) unit ashore. Currently this 
capability does not exist. Figure 2 depicts the envisioned make-up of the seabase. 
 
Figure 2.   Depiction of the seabase concept with the airfield afloat and port facilities 
afloat. The seabase can be as small as three vessels or as large as required for 
mission accomplishment. (From Doyle, 2008)  
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This innovative basing plan eliminates the need to control hostile ports or 
airfields. It also allows greater flexibility when operating in countries that do not have the 
necessary infrastructure at ports or airfields for conducting military operations. The 
seabasing concept expands upon the concepts of Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
(OMFTS) and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM), where the days of storming a 
heavily defended beachhead are no longer the objective. All of these initiatives move the 
maneuver area into the ocean, giving combatant commanders the capability to maneuver 
combat elements under the concealment of the horizon (MCCDC, 1996). Seabasing also 
reduces force protection challenges ashore, especially during early stages of a crisis. 
Gone are the days of landing on a heavily defended beach and creating a large footprint 
once ashore. Combatant commanders now have at their disposal an advanced 
expeditionary and amphibious capability that gives them the flexibility to focus on entry 
points where the enemy is most vulnerable or is absent. This gives the commander an 
advantage over the enemy force (CNO, 2006). 
3.  The Seabase Connector Transformable Craft  
In order to bring forces to bear on the enemy from the seabase, a seabase 
connector is required. Numerous studies concluded that an effective seabase operation 
must have more capable connector craft than currently available (Conway, 2006; CNO, 
05; CNO, 06; MCCDC, 96; MCCDC, 1997). The current inventory of seabase connectors 
in place consists of medium and heavy lift aircraft, landing craft air cushion (LCAC), and 
landing craft utility (LCU). There are several problems with the current inventory of 
seabase connectors. These limitations include the limited cargo capacity of aircraft and 
the LCAC, the slow travel speed of the LCU, and the inability of the LCAC and LCU to 
operate in sea states higher than 2. Under the BAA, a prototype will be designed to 
overcome these shortfalls (Helland, Rowden, & Jimenez, 2009).  
The transformable craft is the proposed prototype that will bridge the gap between 
operational speed, lift capability, operability in sea states up to sea state 4, and landing on 
unimproved beaches. The T-Craft will also enable the conduct of the full range of 
military operations (ROMO) from the sea. Requirements for the T-Craft include the 
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ability to deploy from an initial staging base unloaded to the seabase with an unrefueled 
range of 2500 nm miles. Once at the seabase, the T-Craft must be able to withstand wave-
induced motions in sea states between 4 and 5 while interfacing with either Navy 
amphibious ships or commercial logistics ships allowing for the rapid transfer of 
materiel. The transfer is followed by high-speed transit of 40 knots to the surf zone with 
an unrefueled range of 500 nm. Finally, the T-Craft will transform into amphibious mode 
and traverse sand bars carrying its load well above the high-water mark, thereby reducing 
the chance of vehicles getting stuck in loose sand. In essence, the T-Craft will perform 
the role of heavy lift surface effect ship (SES) and transition to amphibious air cushioned 
vehicle (ACV) while carrying the same load (Anderson & Triola, 2009). 
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
The ending of the Cold War brought about the initial impetus for the seabasing 
concept development. For almost two decades, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have 
been actively engaged in producing a robust and comprehensive body of seabasing 
concepts and supporting Concepts of Operations (CONOPS). In recent years, this body of 
work has expanded to include the joint community and has been formalized into naval 
doctrine (MCCDC, 2009). In the early 1990s, several white papers were published that 
addressed this change in premise of naval operations. The 1991 white paper The Way 
Ahead addressed the concept of a new pattern of deployments and force composition to 
maintain the forward presence required to support the full ROMO. From the Sea was 
published in 1992; it postulates the need for expeditionary operations that focus on the 
littorals and joint force enabling (MCCDC, 2009). Operational Maneuver From the Sea, 
published in 1996, served as the capstone of a series of operating concepts on naval 
operations. In essence, 
OMFTS is an amphibious operation that seeks to use the sea as an avenue 
for maneuvering against some operational-level objective, pitting strength 
against weakness. It is a concept for projecting maritime power ashore. 
The concept recognizes the requirements for forcible entry—an 
amphibious landing in the face of organized military resistance—although 
not all operational maneuvers from the sea entail forcible. 
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Between 2002 and 2004, the office of the Secretary of Defense issued guidance to 
increase strategic speed for two almost-simultaneous major combat operations. The 
guidance drove further development of optimizing the ability of projecting combat power 
from the sea. This discussion led to the development of the Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade (MEB) and the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) as the primary 
means of carrying out this mission (RAND, 2007). Maritime Prepositioning Force 
(Future) described the ways in which maritime prepositioning, although it had been 
effective during recent operations, needed to evolve in order to fully support OMFTS and 
future operations. In this paper, the call was made for new technologies to be pursued and 
developed in order to permit the next generation to contribute to operational 
employments across the full range of operations, and thus to include the rapid 
reinforcement of forward deployed amphibious forces (MCCDC, 2009).  
“Naval Power 21” articulated a unified naval vision, and emphasized the utility of 
naval forces across a range of operations. It also highlighted the importance of seabasing 
for projecting “power, defense, and influence” (MCCDC, 2009). “Naval Transformation 
Roadmap 2003” and “Sea Power 21” were published in 2003. “Naval Transformation 
Roadmap” stated, “seabasing [as] a national capability, is our overarching 
transformational operating concept,” describing it as the global power projection of 
offensive and defensive forces from the sea to execute combat operations ashore 
(MCCDC, 2009). “Sea Power 21” documented the Navy’s operational vision for the 21st 
century. This vision developed the fundamental premise to help joint force commanders 
accelerate deployment and employment of naval power and to enhance seaborne 
positioning assets. “Sea Power 21” goes on to explain that this will be accomplished by 
minimizing logistics stockpiles ashore, which in turn will reduce the operational demand 
for sealift and airlift assets, ultimately permitting the forward positioning of joint forces 
for immediate employment (RAND, 2007). 
Finally, in 2005, “Seabasing Joint Integration Concept” (JIC) was published. This 
document leveraged all of the concepts developed during the period from the early 1990s 
to 2005 and put all services on the same road map for strategic development. The 
“Seabasing JIC” describes how combinations of forces that are forward deployed and 
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prepositioned could provide strategic speed, access, and persistence for a range of 
military operations. It outlines these key concepts of seabasing: closing, assembling, 
employing, sustaining, and reconstituting joint forces from a seabase. It also defines its 
relevance to strategic guidance and joint concepts, lays out assumptions and risks, 
identifies essential capabilities, defines attributes, and provides guidelines of how joint 
seabasing can be executed to support national military objectives (DoD, 2005). Along 
with the document, the “Seabasing JIC” was amplified by four detailed, illustrative 
CONOPS set in the 2015 to 2025 timeframe. 
In March 2005, “National Defense Strategy” (NDS) emphasized the importance 
of influencing events before challenges became more dangerous and less manageable. It 
explained that the U.S. faced a time of uncertainty and that it needed to address an array 
of current and future adversaries. These adversaries were suspected of employing 
traditional, irregular, and weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. (DoD, 2005; 
MCCDC, 2005; MCCDC, 2009). It identified the need to enhance eight key operational 
capabilities, most of which made the case for seabase operations. In his speech to the 
graduating class of the U.S. Naval Academy in 2005, President Bush said, “We are 
developing joint sea bases that will allow our forces to strike from floating platforms 
close to the action, instead of being dependent on land bases far from the fight” (DoD, 
2005). The current National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National 
Military Strategy all emphasize the need for military access to retain global freedom of 
action (MCCDC, 2009). They postulate that future security environments will become 
increasingly complicated due to international political relationships, increased acts of 
terrorism, the expanded influence of non-state actors, and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). Potential enemies are more likely to attack U.S. forces abroad 
with increasingly lethal weapons, including WMD. Clearly, the need for military access 
to retain global freedom of action has been a consistent theme over the last two decades. 
The seabasing concept conforms to this strategic initiative and is an extension of the goal 
of assuring allies and friends, deterring aggression and enemies, dissuading potential 
adversaries, rapidly responding to irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges, and if 
necessary, quickly defeating foes in combat (DoD, 2005).   
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With the solidification of the seabasing concept, the next step was to modernize 
seabase connectors. As stated earlier in this chapter, the current inventory of seabase 
connectors cannot stand up to the robust demands of the new concept of operations. This 
brought about BAA 05-020, which was one of three initiatives to enhance seabase 
operations. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this thesis is to simulate T-Craft operations in a JOA and analyze its 
performance with respect to survivability in a hostile environment. This was done by the 
modeling and simulation of two scenarios. The first is a peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement scenario and the next is a regional conflict scenario. These simulations were 
run in order to address the following questions:  
• Does the T-Craft need an organic self-defense capability? 
• How should the T-Craft be employed when a threat exists? 
In addressing these questions, data farming allows for the understanding of an 
enormous landscape of possibilities, along with the advantages to this new technology 
and with the short falls.  
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This research will provide the following stakeholders—the U.S. Navy, the U.S. 
Marine Corps, the Office of Naval Research and contract developers—with an 
understanding of operational performance requirements, which will hopefully aide in 
design determinations and influence concept of operations and employment methods. 
Through modeling and simulation (M&S) the objectives include addressing, and possibly 
validating, some of the T-Craft requirements given in the BAA: determining critical 
factors and threshold values, assessing sensitivities, evaluating performance across a 
spectrum of conflict conditions, and generating distributions on future possibilities.  
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E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses an agent-based distillation, which is a type of computer 
simulation that attempts to capture the critical factors of interest in combat without 
explicitly modeling all of the physical details. A low resolution, agent-based simulation 
tool is used to simulate a set of approved scenarios for the T-Craft. Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata (MANA), developed by New Zealand’s Defense Technology Agency 
(DTA), is the tool used to model T-Craft operations in an environment where an enemy 
threat is present (Anderson, Galligan, Lauren, & McIntosh, 2007). 
Through the use of MANA, a robust design of experiment, and data farming, this 
thesis develops a means by which ONR can evaluate design configurations of the T-Craft 
and make an informed decision on how the T-Craft should be protected while engaged in 
operations that cover the full ROMO. Quantifiable measures of effectiveness for both 
mission areas covered by this thesis are identified and used to determine a concept of 
employment. Design of experiment techniques are used to vary the speed, the force size, 
and the probabilities of detection and kill for each agent developed. Once the baseline 
model was developed, further high dimensional experiments were used to explore the 
performance of the T-Craft in threat situations. Exploratory analysis, or data farming, 
identified previously undetermined characteristics and situations that became apparent 
during the simulation runs (Cioppa, Lucas, & Sanchez, 2004). Statistical analysis and 
other analytical analysis techniques identified and determined the importance of 
interactions between variables and led to a better understanding of the significance of the 
data. The results of the analysis will help identify possible alternative methods of 
employing the T-Craft, which could contribute to mission success.   
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II begins with a more detailed description of the T-Craft and the 
scenarios that are used to test the T-Craft’s performance. The chapter closes with a 
detailed description of the simulation model created for this thesis and an overview of the 
modeling tool MANA. Chapter III offers a discussion of the design of experiments that 
are used for this analysis and includes a description of the variables used in the analysis 
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phase, as well as an explanation of Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLHs). 
Chapter IV gives a description of the analytical methods used to interpret the results of 
the simulated tests and concludes with an explanation of the analytical results. Chapter V 
completes the thesis with a discussion of the insights gleaned from the analysis and 
recommendations for follow-on research. 
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II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Seabasing is the future of joint operations abroad. However, without sufficient 
numbers of supporting craft, the seabase concept will be ineffective in the ability to 
accelerate the deployment of forces and sustainment ashore. An ineffective seabase 
would then limit rather than enhance the joint force commanders’ flexibility in 
conducting operations (National Defense Research Institute, 2007). The purpose of the 
INP initiated by ONR was to develop all of the technology required to ensure the success 
of seabasing and OMFTS. Nevertheless, the T-Craft is the conduit to mission success. 
For that reason, the T-Craft’s operation parameters will need to be meticulously tested. 
Some of those tests were replicated in this thesis through robust modeling and simulation 
(M&S). The scenarios developed in this thesis address two of the five potential mission 
packages that the T-Craft is expected to perform. Included in these scenarios are enemy 
threats that the T-Craft may encounter while operating. The concept paper, “Ship-To-
Objective Maneuver,” states that 
[h]ostile combined arms forces supported by integrated air and coastal 
defense systems remain the greatest threat to landing forces[...] the enemy 
may attempt to defeat or disrupt the amphibious force by contesting 
control of the air, surface, or subsurface battle space. He may attack the 
force at sea, attempt to repel the landing force during the assault phase, 
counter attack on land to eject the landing for, or any combination of the 
above. (MCCDC, 1997)    
It is imperative that critical vulnerabilities and design recommendations be 
identified in the design and development stage rather than after full-rate production of the 
T-Craft begins. In this chapter, an introduction and description of the T-Craft is 
presented, followed by a brief definition of the range of military operations (ROMO) that 
the T-Craft is expected to perform, along with a description of the scenarios used in this 
thesis. Finally, the agent-based model MANA and the model’s behavior are discussed.    
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B. WHAT IS THE TRANSFORMABLE CRAFT? 
1. Overview  
The Transformable Craft, or T-Craft, was briefly described in Chapter I; this 
chapter provides a more detailed look. “Game-changing” performance is the defining 
concept of the T-Craft. It will be bigger, faster, and more durable than any other seabase 
connector in the Navy’s current inventory. The need for this innovative technology is a 
result of moving the seabase from the current 8 to 15 nm off the coast to 150 to 200 nm 
off the coast. By design, ONR identified a list of operational capabilities the T-Craft 
should posses. Figure 3 lists the prescribed operational capabilities and Table 1 lists the 
desired operating thresholds of the T-Craft as published in the BAA.   
 
Figure 3.   Transformable craft capability list. (From ONR, 2005) 
 
Table 1.   Transformable craft thresholds and objectives. (From ONR, 2005) 
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The LCAC is the current high-speed seabase connector in use by the Navy today. 
It is capable of operating from amphibious deck ships of the ARG and is fully 
amphibious. Although it has been said that the T-Craft is not, and will not be developed 
as a replacement for the LCAC, the LCAC is used as a reference to give an appreciation 
of the new technology being developed. The LCAC’s cargo area is 1809 square feet and 
it can lift up to 75 long tons. Its top speed is listed as 40 knots and it can travel up to 200 
nm with payload at 40 knots, or 300 nm with payload at 35 knots, without refueling. The 
LCAC can transport only one M1A1 tank and primarily operates in sea state 2 or below 
(Global Security.org, 2006a). From these numbers, one can see that the T-Craft will have 
more than twice the cargo space and potentially up to ten times the LCAC’s lift 
capability. In addition, the T-Craft is being designed as a surface effect ship with the 
capability of transforming into an amphibious ship. This allows the T-Craft to deploy 
from an initial staging base under its own power and increases its flexibility of use. In 
light of the capabilities previously listed, there are some other design considerations that 
have been specifically left out. These items are listed in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   Capabilities not required to be built in to the T-Craft. (From ONR, 2005) 
2. Seaframe 
When ONR published the BAA, three design proposals were approved. The three 
corporations currently developing prototypes for this program are Alion, Textron, and 
Umoe Mandal. Figures 5, 6, and 7 show design sketches of each prototype being 
developed.    
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Figure 5.   The Alion Transformable Craft prototype is built on a catamaran-type 
frame. (From Chang, 2008) 
Each design will have the challenges of meeting the specified capabilities 
prescribed by ONR. Some of these challenges include developing technology that is large 
enough to self-deploy over long distances in a high sea state while at the same time 
maintaining fuel efficiency. This will be achieved by using a catamaran frame (Alion) or 
high-ratio mono-hulls (Textron and Umoe); this SES cushion design provides low wetted 
area for high-speed powering and motion control.    
 
Figure 6.   The Textron Transformable Craft prototype closely resembles the LCAC, 
which Textron also designed; both have an open cargo area. (From Chang, 2008) 
The stability provided by the frame design facilitates steady cargo transfer at the 
seabase in high sea states. As the fully loaded T-Craft nears the shore, it then transforms 
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into an amphibious vehicle in order to traverse sand bars and land securely on the beach. 
The designed ACV and skirt system enables amphibious operations. This transformation 
process reverses itself once the T-Craft transitions back to a SES for its return to the 
seabase for follow-on operations (Wilson, 2009). 
In addition to the hull design, the engine and structural material also play a role in 
the game-changing performance of the T-Craft. The power plant boasts a multi-mode 
propulsion system that increases the T-Craft’s range and that provides fuel-efficient high-
speed open ocean transit. It also provides the power needed for high-speed transit 
between the seabase and shore along with amphibious propulsion. Aluminum, titanium, 
and composites are being tested as potential hull and structural materials (Dale, 2010).   
 
 
Figure 7.   The Umoe Transformable Craft prototype has a high-speed surface effect 
hull design with closed cargo area. (From Chang, 2008) 
Ramp technologies and dynamic positioning systems are necessary to accomplish 
material transfer at the sea base in high sea states, and advances in automation and human 
systems integration are required in order for the T-Craft to be operated by a minimal two- 
to three-man crew. Table 2 shows some of the T-Craft’s design specifications.  
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Table 2.   Prototype design specifications. (Dale, 2010) 
In essence, the T-Craft is three vessels in one (SES, Transport Ship Vessel, and 
ACV) and must be fully operational in each mode without assistance from outside 
equipment. Contractors are currently in the process of designing their innovative systems 
in anticipation of presenting them to ONR.  
3. Mission Framework 
As a joint force asset, the T-Craft will be used across the full ROMO. Joint 
Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” details a list of military activities employed across 
the ROMO (DoD, 2005). Figure 8 shows the range and types of military operations that 
the T-Craft will support. 
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Figure 8.   Range of military operations. (From Anderson, et al., 2009c) 
For the purposes of the T-Craft program, it is possible to categorize the ROMO 
and types of military operations into an abstract framework that illustrates the high-level 
operational contexts in which future T-Craft assets could be deployed and employed. 
Table 3 lists the recommended categories of military operations for consideration. 
 
Figure 9.   Types of military operations. (From Anderson, et al., 2009c) 
The framework attempts to align mission groupings based on two primary 
considerations. The first is operational scale; and the second is number and type of 
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resources typically deployed. In all, the 20 military operation types listed in Figure 9 
occur through five operational categories. Table 3 lists operational categories, which 
provides additional context and structure for further assessment for the T-Craft. 
 
Table 3.   Recommended T-Craft operational categories. (From Anderson, et al., 
2009c) 
One of the systems that have not been mentioned thus far is the armament system. 
This fact is because the initial designs do not require weapon systems. As with most 
military vehicles designed to support combat operations, it would be typical to see the 
design or mention of some form of weapon system or countermeasures to be a part of the 
development. However, that is not the case with the T-Craft. If the T-Craft is going to 
serve to deliver forces and sustainment for a combat operation such as forced entry 
against a determined adversary, the T-Craft must be designed to function in the combat 
environment (Anderson, et al., 2009c). The key here is that the T-Craft must be able to 
survive in a hostile environment. It is important to mention that this thesis is not 
preconditioned to suggest the T-Craft needs a weapon. On the contrary, the intent is to 
develop a recommendation based on thorough analysis of various aspects of potential 
environments that the T-Craft may encounter, and of the Navy’s available assets to 
protect the T-Craft.   
C. DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIOS  
 The scenarios used in this thesis were developed in other studies related to the T-
Craft. Those scenarios focused mainly on the concept of logistic support and sustainment 
for on-going operations. In this thesis, those same scenarios, slightly modified, are used 
to assess the threat environment and to develop some suggestions as to how to properly 
protect the T-Craft as it conducts its mission. The first scenario is a peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement operation in Colombia, South America. The second scenario takes 
place in Malaysia, where a regional conflict has developed.  
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It is important to note at this point that the “Arc of Instability” is an area of 
interconnected and politically unstable nation states in the Asia-Pacific region. The term 
originated in the early 1990s and is used to suggest that if one nation located in an 
interconnected chain is destabilized, major political, military, and economic 
repercussions will occur in neighboring countries (MCCDC, 1996). This situation could 
in turn result in external interdiction from other nations or organizations, namely the 
United Nations or the United States. Figure 10 shows the interconnected regions that are 
known as the “Arc of Instability.” While this is not an official classification, it is 
highlighted for planning guidance and strategy for future operations. As can be seen in 
Figure 10, this region consists of coastal countries, making it substantially a maritime 
domain; therefore, a naval force is uniquely suited to respond (Conway, 2006; DoD, 
2005).  
 
Figure 10.   The “Arc of Instability” as described by the Pentagon for future conflicts 
and military presence. (From Doyle, 2008) 
While the scenarios used in this thesis are realistic and depict potential future 
threats and operations, the enemy threat was never taken into account. A full description 
of both scenarios can be found in Appendix A. The situations described below are tactical 
excerpts based on the region and type of operations.  
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1. Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement 
The year is 2025, and the Colombian Civil War has raged in the country for 60 
years. The Colombian people appear to have lost confidence in the democratic process. 
The economy is suffering from the worst crisis the country has ever seen. During the 
previous two years, guerrillas and the San José Cartel have executed thousands of public 
officials and are responsible for the killing of more than 17,000 people in 420 massacres 
(Helland, Jimenez, & Rowden, 2009; Helland, Paulo, & Rowden, 2008).  
The San José cartel has established an alliance with the Colombian insurgency 
movement, specifically the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (RAFC). This 
aforementioned relationship later sparked the creation of the Common Front of the 
Liberation of Colombia (CFLC), which later became the security force for the San José 
cartel. From 2023 to 2025, the CFLC was able to cripple the Colombian armed forces, 
including the Air Force and Navy. They were able to do this through coordinated attacks 
and support from the insurgency (Helland, et al., 2009; Helland, et al., 2008).  
a. Enemy 
Through coordinated attacks, the CFLC seized 37 of 41 Naval vessels 
from Colombian bases. This seizure was confirmed when a merchant vessel sank after 
striking a mine 37 miles northwest of Buenaventura (Helland, et al., 2009). In addition to 
the surface threat, the CFLC has also reportedly converted its semi-submersible 
technology from drug trafficking to carrying explosives, presumably in order to defend 
the Colombian coast from any form of intervention. It has also been confirmed that 
Venezuela has provided patrol craft and weapons to the CFLC and Colombian cartels.  
b. Friendly 
The United Nations (U.N.) Security Counsel has held several meetings on 
the instability in the region. The United States has sought a resolution calling for a U.N. 
peacekeeping force to restore the failed government, and eliminate the CFLC and other 
cartels. After seeing the resolution vetoed, the U.S. decided to unilaterally insert forces 
into Colombia that are capable of destroying the cartels, resisting Venezuelan influence, 
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and ultimately restoring a democratic government (Helland, et al., 2009). For the purpose 
of this thesis, the 2nd MEB embarked on two Amphibious Ready Groups are the forces 
that will be inserted.  
The MEB will be inserted on the southern Colombian coast near the 
coastal town of Tumaco. The seabase will be established 50 nm of the coast of Colombia. 
The initial assault echelon will land under cover of darkness while the T-Craft will 
transport the follow on assault elements and sustainment required to conduct operations.  
Included in the seabase are two ARGs carrying the MEB, an MPF(F) 
squadron, and a section of littoral combat ships. The LPDs will provide the capability to 
conduct air operations from the sea base. The other ships in the ARG will perform the 
traditional duties of debarking Marines and craft to shore. The MPF(F) will provided 
sustainment for operations ashore. The T-Craft will be the primary seabase connector for 
follow-on assault waves and sustainment. The total number of T-Craft in this scenario 
will vary. Finally, the section of littoral combat ships contains a mix of surface warfare-
configured ships and antisubmarine warfare configured ships. The primary mission of the 
LCSs is to escort the T-Craft to and from shore, immobilizing any threat that appears 
along the way. Organic to the littoral combat ship, and used in this scenario, is the MH-
60R. The primary mission of the MH-60R is to provide early detection and eliminate 
enemy threats, if capable. This portion of the operation should take no more than 24 
hours to conduct. 
c. Mission 
The mission of the T-Craft is to provide the uninterrupted build-up of 
combat power ashore. The mission of the LCSs is to clear the sea-lanes of enemy forces 




Figure 11.   Screen shot of Colombia scenario at problem start. The sea base contains 
the T-Craft, LCS SW and ASW, MH-60, and Destroyers. Red Home 1 and 3 
contain patrol boats. Red Home 2 contains semi-submersibles. 
2. Regional conflict 
The Kalimantan (KA) Republic became an independent nation in October 2002, 
when General Gegwan Riady proclaimed that the four Indonesian provinces on Borneo 
were seceding from Indonesia to create a new republic. In the year 2025, the KA 
Republic suffered a reversal in its economic fortunes due to the collapse of the world 
petroleum market and a revelation of overestimated offshore energy resources. As a 
result of this new economic position, Riady sought financial aid from their neighbors to 
the North, Malaysia, and Brunei. But, with Kalimantan’s debt in the billions, neither 
neighbor was willing to offer financial support. Outraged, Riady sought to correct the 
economic inequality between North and South, developing the mantra “One Borneo, One 
Nation.” This slogan later became the central focus of the KA military planning (Helland, 
et al., 2009; Helland, et al., 2008).  
a. Enemy 
The KA Government called on the Malaysian separatists movement to 
help KA in the coming fight for economic equality. Two Kalimantan army divisions 
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began using air and amphibious forces to gain footholds in Malaysia. The First 
Kalimantan Division (KD) landed near Kuching and began driving west through 
Malaysian territory. The Third KD moved into Sandakan on the east coast of Malaysia, 
and began driving west towards Brunei. Reportedly, KA naval forces laid sea mines in 
the Trusan Strait, effectively blocking Malaysian and Brunei naval forces (Helland, et al., 
2009; Helland, et al., 2008).  
It is believed that KA forces will use their naval patrol craft to launch 
attacks on forces attempting to land along the Malaysian coast. The KA will further use 
swarm tactics on soft targets in order to disrupt operations to thwart their operations. 
b. Friendly 
The U.S. will reinforce Malaysian units in order to deter further KA 
expedition and to conduct combat operations should deterrence fail. The 1st MEB will 
support forces near Bintulu. The threat of sea mines will prevent the use of major shore 
points of debarkation until mine countermeasure assets can clear the restricted waterways 
(Helland, et al., 2009). Thus, forces will arrive via T-Craft to beachheads near friendly 
forces. The seabase will consist of two MPF(F) squadrons collocated to reduce naval 
security requirements. The seabase will also consist of two LCS detachments configured 
with surface and antisubmarine warfare packages.  
c. Mission 
The mission of the T-Craft is to provide the uninterrupted build-up of 
combat power ashore. The mission of the LCSs is to clear the sea-lanes of enemy forces 




Figure 12.   Screen shot Malaysia scenario at problem start. The sea base contains the 
T-Craft, LCS SW and ASW, MH-60, and Destroyers. Red Home 1 and 4 contain 
patrol boats. Red Home 2 and 3 contain swarm boats.   
D. THE AGENT-BASED MODEL MANA 
 With the details of the scenario described, the tool used to model the scenarios 
will now be introduced. The introduction of the modeling environment is followed by an 
overview of how the scenarios are implemented in the model.  
1. What is MANA? 
Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) is an agent-based distillation 
model. It was designed by the New Zealand DTA for use as a scenario-exploring model, 
and is intended to address a broad range of problems. MANA was developed as a result 
of the frustrations in analyzing the output of physics-based models.  
While these [physics-based] models purport to be detailed […] it becomes 
clear immediately once one starts to attempt to analyze the value of 
various aspects such as situational awareness, command and control, and 
the informational edge that enhanced sensors provide, that physics based 
models are quite limited. (Anderson, et al., 2007)  
Physics-based models tend to predetermine the behavioral outcomes of agents and 
do not take into account abnormal or random behavior. DTA took the shortcomings of 
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physics-based models into account and developed MANA to compensate for the 
behavioral activities of entities in the combat model (Anderson, et al., 2007).   
MANA is based on two key components. The first is that the behavior of entities 
within a combat model is a critical component of the analysis of the model’s possible 
outcomes. Second, time may be used ineffectively when using highly detailed physics-
based models for determining force mixes and combat effectiveness (Anderson, et al., 
2007). These aforementioned components were the main influence in making MANA 
version 5 the model of choice in this thesis. Other factors that influenced the decision to 
use MANA include flexibility, relative ease of use, and the ability to run large 
experiments in a relatively short time period. The MANA model allows the easy 
incorporation of terrain and elevation, communications, and numerous pre-programmed 
state changes. In MANA, one can quickly build a rough skeleton of the model from a 
realistic scenario, and then refine agent parameters and state changes to create a 
reasonably accurate model of the combat interactions desired. The flexibility of the 
model allows simple changes to be made in order to conduct experiments and what-if 
analysis. In this research, a MANA model was constructed iteratively through the use of 
the scenario and research into the agent attributes and properties. Once the base case was 
constructed, it was simple to create numerous variations to fully explore the questions 
posed by this research. 
 
Figure 13.   Screen shot of MANA version 5  “about” screen with contact information. 
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2. Characteristics of MANA  
MANA builds on and complements the earlier ISAAC-EINSTein Cellular 
Automaton (CA) models developed by the Center for Naval Analyses. It was designed to 
explore key concepts that ISAAC was unable to explore at the time (Anderson, et al., 
2007). Specifically, MANA was able to capture: 
• Situational Awareness: A collective group memory of perceived enemy 
contacts. This is done through the use of situational awareness maps. 
MANA has two: squad map and inorganic map. The squad map provides 
direct information through squad contacts and the inorganic map provides 
information through communication links. Agents have situational 
awareness of the other agents and terrain that is updated by sensors and 
communications. 
• Communications: Allows communication of contact sightings between 
squads. The communications feature can be explored through several 
parameters and characteristics in MANA. Individual agents may have 
different behavior parameters, capabilities, sensors, weapons, and 
communications. 
• Terrain Map: This contains terrain features much like a regular chart or 
map. Terrain can be developed in such a realistic way that agents can 
travel on roads or seek cover behind structures built into the model. 
Terrain features can be built into any scenario in such a way to accurately 
depict what the modeler is trying to model. 
• Waypoints: Agents within MANA can travel to multiple objectives, they 
are not limited to just one path or goal. 
• Event-driven personality changes: Agents are developed to react 
independently on the battlefield according to their own individual 
characteristics. To aid the user in creating a more realistic behavior, there 
are a multitude of default event triggers available in MANA. Each trigger 
allows you to create agent behavior based on the action or trigger. Some of 
the triggers available in MANA are: reach waypoints, out of ammo, being 
shot at, enemy contact, squad death, and out of fuel to name only a few. 
Personality changes can be for an individual or an entire squad (Anderson, 
et al., 2007). 
The MANA modeling environment is user-friendly and is quick to understand. It 
has well-developed Graphical User Interface (GUI) and contains data farming features 
that provide the ability to explore an extensive range of input parameter settings in 
minimal time.    
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E. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
1. Goal 
The scenarios developed for this study were designed to gain insight into the 
significance of arming or escorting the T-Craft when there is a threat, as opposed to 
conducting operations unarmed and unescorted in the same hostile environment. The 
primary measure of effectiveness (MOE) is mean T-Craft Survival Rate and the 
secondary MOE is mean Number of T-Craft Ashore. Some of the factors varied in this 
simulation are the number of T-Craft, the number and type of LCSs, the number of MH-
60s, the number of Destroyers and the number of enemy craft. 
2. Terrain and Scale 
Because MANA is a time step model, there must be a mapping from real time to 
simulation time, and from real space to simulation space. In the implementation of this 
scenario, one model time step is equal to ten seconds of real time. Each scenario lasts no 
longer than 8640 time steps, which equals 24 hours. The simulation map consists of 1760 
pixels by 1272 pixels, corresponding to a real world map of 440 nm by 318 nm. This 
produces a pixel to nautical mile ratio of about 4:1, which provides good detail for 
accurate modeling of agent movements. Each pixel is thus approximately 1/4 of a 
nautical mile, or 463 meters. Although this scenario takes place at sea and force-on-force 
engagements generally take place over a large distance, the use of a larger pixel to 
nautical mile ratio would create unrealistic agent movements. The above combination 
translates into a single simulation run that lasts approximately two to three minutes on a 
modern laptop processor. The time variation is a result of the number agents being used 
in a run. 
MANA was originally developed to model land warfare; however, MANA does 
have the capability to create sea-based and other type scenarios. Default terrains such as 
hilltop, light or heavy brush, roads, and walls give way to islands and water. Because the 
scenarios for this research are all nautical, the only terrain used is a customized coastline 
feature that prevents ships and semi-submersibles from running aground. A terrain map 
was created by selecting the desired area map, and then using the MANA Scenario Map 
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Editor to line the coastline in the map with the coastline feature. The agents are able to 
use situational awareness features to navigate along the terrain. Different terrain features 
are assigned different colors in MANA: gray with a red, green, and blue (RGB) of 190 is 
the color for the coastline feature. Figure 14 shows the edit terrain properties screen 
through which the coastline feature was created. 
 
Figure 14.   Screen shot of Edit Terrain Properties.  
The terrain map is not seen by the user while conducting runs; rather, what is seen 
is the background map. This allows the user to display a recognizable, real-world map 
during simulations without affecting the agent’s simulation awareness. Essentially, the 
terrain map is for the agents and the background map is for the user. Figure 15 shows the 
terrain and background maps for the Colombia scenario. 
 
Figure 15.   Background (left) and Terrain (right) maps used in the Colombia scenario. 
The gray lining along the terrain map is the coastline feature. The Malaysia 
scenario was painted in the same manner. 
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3. Enemy Forces 
Each enemy agent is assigned a home location. In both scenarios, in an attempt to 
vary enemy threat activity, enemy agents are set to have random start times, i.e., with 
each iteration of the model, the order in which enemy agents appear on the game board is 
random. The patrol boats will patrol the coast until they detect friendly forces, and the 
patrol route is set by a series of waypoints along the coastline. The primary target of the 
patrol boat is the T-Craft because it is not armed or is only lightly armed. The secondary 
targets for the patrol boats are the LCSs. If a patrol boat comes in contact with either of 
the aforementioned targets, it will increase speed and attack those targets. If faced with 
both targets at the same time, the personality is set to go for the T-Craft.    
In the Colombia scenario, semi-submersibles “patrol” in the home position along 
the coastline where friendly forces previously landed, and are expected to land. The semi-
submersibles are remote-guided and are very hard to detect. They will continue to float 
until destroyed by friendly force fire or detonating on friendly craft.  
Finally, the swarm tactic is a threat relevant in the Malaysia scenario. Swarm 
boats patrol very close to the coastline until they detect friendly forces; the patrol route is 
set by a series of waypoints along the coastline. The swarm boats, like patrol boats, have 
the primary target of the T-Craft. However, unlike patrol boats, swarm boats stay away 
from the LCSs once detected. If an LCS is detected, a swarm boat will try to evade the 
threat. When the swarm boats come in contact with the T-Craft, the designed behavior is 
to group all boats together (swarm) and attack the T-Craft.   
4. Friendly Forces 
Each friendly agent is assigned a home location that also represents the seabase. 
In addition, friendly agents are assigned waypoints that will direct them from the seabase 
to the shore base, and back. The only friendly agent that is stationary is the destroyer. In 
both scenarios, the destroyer stays at the seabase and provides oversight for sustainment 
operations. The T-Craft transits from the seabase to the shore, avoiding enemy patrol boat 
and swarm threats. When the T-Craft detects a semi-submersible, the T-Craft attempts to 
slow down in order to maneuver around it or destroys it with its onboard weapon system, 
if armed.  
 30
The LCSs patrol the waters between the seabase and the shore base. They are 
formed in such a way to provide a lane through which the T-Craft can transit. Once an 
enemy is detected, the LCSs engage the enemy and return to their escort mission. Organic 
to both the LCS and destroyer are the MH-60. In each scenario, the MH-60 flies a search 
pattern in order to detect and engage any enemy threat. The refueling of the MH-60 is 
simulated through the rearming of the helicopter. Once out of hellfire missiles, the MH-
60 will return to the seabase to rearm and refuel, which takes an hour.   
5. Data Sources, Abstractions, and Assumptions 
In order to better understand the simulation model, it is important to know the 
source of input data and assumptions made in the modeling effort. In this simulation, 
communications and logistics are assumed to work perfectly, i.e., regarding logistics, the 
location and number of available mission packages is not considered, and fuel (with the 
exception of helicopters) is unlimited. Failure of equipment and maintenance are also not 
considered in this simulation. 
Enemy force sensor and weapon information, number of weapons per enemy 
agent, and capabilities of certain friendly sensors and weapons were taken from Jane’s 
Fighting Ships 2006, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World (15th ed.), 
and the Global Security Web site. The values given to enemy sensors and weapons were 
generalized and reviewed by subject matter experts.  
Enemy and friendly weapon systems posed another modeling challenge. Since 
there are friendly aircraft in each scenario, weapons had to be programmed to deal with 
this threat. However, those weapons that would not normally fire at air targets had to be 
adjusted. Also, in the Colombia scenario, due to the angle of fire, not all weapons could 
be used to engage the semi-submersibles. Thus, in order to compensate for both issues, 
the advanced weapon feature was used. Under the weapons tabs, weapons systems were 
modified so that the weapon would only engage class-specific targets in order to obtain 
the needed realism in each scenario. 
In the Colombia scenario, the sensor classification and detection range for the 
semi-submersible was very different from that of the patrol boats and swarm boats. To 
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deal with these differences, friendly forces were assigned two separate sensor types. The 
sensor classification range and the detection ranges were much smaller for the semi-
submersibles than for the boats. The advanced sensor was used to create a near-, mid-, 
and far-range detection rate with varying classification probabilities. Designing the 
sensor in this manner added to the realism of how difficult it would be to detect the semi-
submersible in the water.  
In these scenarios, sea-based assets performed integrated force protection. These 
forces included surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and air and missile defenses, as 
well as assets organic to forces assembling at sea (DoD, 2005). Due to the significant 
firepower located at the seabase, the threat of the seabase being attacked was not 
addressed. It was assumed that the U.S. forces had air superiority in both scenarios and 
that there was no deep-water sub-surface threat in either scenario.    
With both of these scenarios some assumptions were made. The first is that the 
MPF(F)  squadron would be ready for use, functioning with the designed capabilities. 
The MPF(F) squadron, still in the developmental stage, was regarded as a major step 
forward in Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations. Unlike the current 
maritime prepositioning ship squadrons, which are densely packed, require safe usable 
ports, and take several days to prepare to unload, the MPF(F) will have the capability to 
sustain a brigade size element from the 14 ships of the squadron (RAND, 2007). 
Furthermore, these scenarios do not specifically address the positioning and ability of the 
T-Craft to dock with the future supply ships. The estimated times to dock, load, transport 
to shore, and return to the seabase, which were gleaned from previous studies, were used 
to account for the time of T-Craft operations. 
As stated earlier in this chapter, there is no design requirement for the T-Craft to 
have a weapon system. After further research and discussion with subject matter experts, 
the recommendation was made to model the T-Craft with an MK110 57mm weapon 
system and a 30mm cannon weapon system. Weight and space requirements were the 
rationale behind this decision. The MK110 is upgraded from the previous design MK3 
57mm; it is currently the secondary weapon on the LCS surface warfare package and the 
primary weapon system on the LCS anti-submarine warfare package. This new 
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technology represents the biggest weapon system the T-Craft would carry without 
compromising space. The 30mm cannon is a much smaller weapon system, but the 
effectiveness of the weapon makes it very efficient to use as a defense weapon system. 
Further, this model does not include the UAVs organic to the LCS_ASW package.  
During the model generation phase, the model was reviewed frequently by 
simulation experts and analysts to ensure the agent behaviors were adequately modeled. 
The model benefited from input from military officers, analysts, and simulation experts at 
NPS and from those affiliated with NPS, although located elsewhere. This feedback was 
used to produce accurate scenarios that would produce quality results. 
6. Summary 
This research uses the MANA simulation tool to model a realistic combat 
environment where the T-Craft will be employed. The scenarios cover specific aspects of 
the threat environment the T-Craft will encounter, with the intent of gaining insights as to 
how the T-Craft should be employed. The result is a simulation that captured the inherent 
dangers of operating in hostile territory and identified potential capabilities for enhancing 
the survivability of the T-Craft. The following chapter contains a description of the 
variables of interest followed by a description of the experiment design. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Data farming is the process of using high performance computers or computing 
grids to run a simulation thousands of times, while simultaneously varying input 
parameters across a large parameter and value space. As a result of data farming, an 
enormous amount of output data is provided that can be analyzed for trends, anomalies, 
and insights (Cioppa, Lucas, & Sanchez, 2004). In this thesis, data farming techniques are 
used to gain insights into T-Craft performance in an operational environment. To ensure 
that the simulation model was searched efficiently, an experimental design was 
necessary. The design in this thesis was developed through the use of state-of-the-art 
Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLHs). By using NOLH, it was possible to 
thoroughly explore the design space, further enhancing the ability to explore simulation 
outputs (Cioppa, Lucas, & Sanchez, 2004). In this chapter, the modeling variables of 
interest are discussed followed by a description of the designs used in this thesis. The 
chapter closes with an explanation of how the experiment was run.  
B. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
 Two types of variables are commonly used in simulation: controllable and 
uncontrollable. Controllable variables are those that can be altered by a decision maker in 
the real world; uncontrollable variables are those that a decision maker cannot control. 
Controllable variables are referred to as decision factors, while uncontrollable variables 
are considered noise factors. This thesis focuses on decision factors in order to provide 
greater insight into how T-Craft should be deployed when a threat is present. Because the 
enemy and their attributes are considered noise factors, the only variable characteristics 
in the designs are the number of red agents present. Modeling details for each agent and 
their sensors and weapons is provided in Appendix B. Table 4 summarizes the variables 




Table 4.   Variable factors used in experimental design. Decision factors are in blue 
print and noise factors are in red print. 
Factor Value Range Description  
T-Craft 5 – 11 Number of T-Craft in a 
given design 
Speed in knots 20 – 55 Speed of the T-Craft in a 
given design 
Active Weapon 1, 2, 3 (both) Weapon that is activated 
during a given design 
LCS_SW 1 – 10 Number of Surface 
Warfare configured LCSs 
in a given design 
LCS_ASW 1 – 5  Number of Anti-
Submarine Warfare 
configured LCSs in a 
given design 
MH – 60 1 – 10  Number of MH – 60s in a 
given design 
Destroyers 1 – 3  Number of Destroyers in a 
given design 
Mk110 57mm Pk 0.5 – 1 Probability of kill by 
57mm 
30mm Cannon Pk 0.5 – 1  Probability of kill by 
30mm 
Red Patrol Boats 
 
0 – 10 Number of Red Patrol 
Boats in a given design 
Semi-submersible 0 – 5  Number of Semi-




0 – 15 Number of Swarm boats 
in a given design 
 
1. Controllable Factors 
The following factors were selected with the intent of obtaining the best insights 
into how the T-Craft should be equipped in a hostile environment.   
 35
a. T-Craft 
The number of T-Craft available at the seabase in a given design. The 
number varied from 5 to 11 in each scenario.  
b. Speed 
The speed at which the T-Craft traveled in a given design. The speed of 
the T-Craft varied from 20 to 55 knots in the full design and from 35 to 55 knots in 
preliminary designs. 
c. Active Weapon 
The active weapon in a given design. The range varied from one to three 
in the full model. Each number represents a weapon configuration.  
• 1 represents the Mk110 57mm weapon system  
• 2 represents the 30mm cannon weapon system  
• 3 represents both weapons being active in a design 
d. LCS_SW 
The number of LCS_SW assigned to the seabase to conduct the escort 
mission for a given design. Since both scenarios represent primarily a surface threat, the 
max number of LCSs in each scenario is 30. 
e. LCS_ASW 
The number of LCS_ASW assigned to the seabase to conduct the escort 
mission for a given design. The maximum number of LCS_ASW in each scenario is five. 
f. MH - 60 
The number of MH – 60s attached to the seabase. The number of MH - 60 
helicopters varied from one to ten in both scenarios. 
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g. Destroyer 
The number of destroyers attached to the seabase. The number of 
destroyers varied from one to three in both scenarios. 
h. MK110 57mm Pk 
The probability of kill (Pk) associated with the MK110 57mm weapon 
system used by the T-Craft seaframe. This variable is modeled in both scenarios.  
i. 30mm Cannon Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the 30mm cannon weapon system 
used by the T-Craft seaframe. This variable is modeled in both scenarios. 
2. Uncontrollable Factors 
The following uncontrollable variables were chosen in order to ensure the 
scenarios were realistically uncertain and to explore the capabilities of the T-Craft and 
escort variations defined by the number of LCSs, MH-60s, and destroyers over a range of 
conditions. These variables are factors that a decision maker would be unable to effect 
and are thus seen as noise factors. 
a. Patrol Boats 
The number of patrol boats used in a given run. The number of patrol 
boats varied from zero to ten in both scenarios, due to their role as the primary threat. The 
patrol boats in the Colombia scenario are modeled on the Venezuelan Navanita class 
patrol craft. The patrol boats in the Malaysia scenario are modeled on the French PR-72 
560 class patrol combatant ship (PGG). 
b. Semi-submersibles 
The number of semi-submersibles used in a given run. They varied from 
zero to five in the Colombia scenario, where they served as a secondary threat. 
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c. Swarm Boats 
The number of swarm boats used in a given run. The number of swarm 
boats varied from 5 to 15 in the Malaysia scenario, due to their role as the secondary 
threat. The swarm boats are modeled after the Filipino FELIX APOLINARIO patrol boat. 
C. THE EXPERIMENT 
1. The Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
The NOLH is a space-filling experimental design technique developed in 2002 by 
Colonel Thomas Cioppa, United States Army, at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
This technique allows for the exploration of a large number of input parameters in an 
efficient number of runs, while maintaining nearly orthogonal design columns (Cioppa, 
2002). The space-filling property of the NOLH allows the analyst to explore more of the 
input space than the traditional factorial design, in which only high and low values are 
considered. Figure 16 shows the space-filling properties of the NOLH design. 
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Figure 16.   Correlation matrix and scatter plot of the full design Colombia scenarios 
that illustrates near orthogonality and the space filling properties of the NOLH. 
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2. Exploratory Model Design 
In order to evaluate the realism of the modeled scenario, an exploratory design 
was developed. This design used a NOLH design that consisted of 18 factors and 129 
design points. Simple rounding was used for discrete variables. Each design point was 
replicated 50 times, generating a total of 6,450 simulated missions. In the design, the 
numbers of friendly and enemy vessels were varied, along with the probability of kill for 
each of the friendly weapon systems, and the friendly sensor detection ranges. The 
measure of effectiveness (MOE) for this run was the mean T-Craft Survival Rate. Had 
the NOLH not been used, in order to conduct a full factorial exploratory run with the 
same 18 factors at only 2 levels, the simulation would have needed to be run 218 times for 
a total of 262,144 replications; each run takes a little over a minute and thus it would 
have taken over 182 processor days to run that design. Analysis of the exploratory runs 
showed a negative correlation with sensor ranges, meaning that the detection of enemy at 
farther distances increased the number of T-Craft kills. As a result, it was determined that 
the behavior of the LCSs was very aggressive in pursuing enemy vessels, leaving the T-
Craft vulnerable to counter attacks. As a result of these experiments, adjustments were 
made to friendly agent behavior. Appendix C contains all of the NOLH designs used in 
this thesis. 
3. Preliminary Model Design 
Once adjustments were made to the model, a preliminary design was developed to 
further explore the simulation. The preliminary design was created to provide a more 
detailed look at each scenario after the refinement from the exploratory design. This 
design consisted of 11 factors and 257 design points. Each design point was replicated 50 
times using the same MOE as before; mean T-Craft Survival Rate. These data points 
were analyzed and the results reviewed during the International Data Farming Workshop 
20 (IDFW 20) by simulation experts, analysts, and military officers to ensure that the 
scenarios were being modeled correctly before conducting the full experiment. Some of 
the adjustments made from these preliminary results include: increasing the number of  
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LCS_SW and MH-60 in both scenarios, adjusting the probability of kill rates of the T-
Craft weapons using the mid range value as the base, and tracking the MOE mean 
Number of T-Craft Ashore.  
4. Full Model Design  
After further refinement to the simulation model based on the inputs from the 
previous designs, the full design was implemented. The full model design consisted of 
two stages. The first stage was developed in order to explore the question of T-Craft 
configuration with respect to having a weapon or not, and having escorts or not. The 
second stage of the design was set up to determine the best employment method of the T-
Craft. The stage one design consisted of eight factors and 513 design points created by 
the NOLH. Each run was replicated 100 times, resulting in 51,300 data points per 
scenario. The stage two design consisted of 11 factors, and 513 design points created by 
the NOLH. Each of these runs was replicated 100 times, resulting in 51,300 data points 
per scenario as well. These data points were used as the research data for this thesis. 
D. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENT 
MANA uses eXtensible Markup Language (XML) files to run simulations. After 
identifying the input variables and creating the runs through the NOLH, an XML file had 
to be created for each run. The subsequent XML files were then placed on a cluster of 
computers operated by the Simulation Experiments and Efficient Design (SEED) Center 
for Data Farming at NPS. This cluster of high performance computers conducted the 
simulations for all of the designs. Chapter IV discusses the output from the full design 
and the data analysis conducted to gain insights into answering the questions posed in 
Chapter I.   
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The methodology described in the previous chapter resulted in a large amount of 
data. This chapter begins with an explanation of how the data was compiled and prepared 
for analysis. The purpose of the analysis was to provide insights into the research 
questions outlined in Chapter I. Next, the data from each scenario is presented and 
analyzed followed by a discussion of the analysis. The chapter concludes with additional 
insights gleaned from this study.  
A. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING 
The simulation output provided by MANA is given in the form of a comma-
separated values (CSV) file that allows for simple handling. In addition to NOLH design 
inputs, the simulation output also provided the number of injuries for each agent, along 
with the number of casualties for each agent identified by the squad number in each 
scenario. Additional columns were added to the output file in order to track the T-Craft 
survival rate and number of T-Craft ashore. The scenario output file contains the results 
of all 100 replications of each run, resulting in 51,300 rows of data. The Statistical 
package JMP version 8 was used to compile and analyze all of the output data provided 
by the simulation run (JMP Statistical Discovery Software, Version 8.0.1, 2009). Using 
JMP, the average of each input combination was taken, resulting in 513 rows of mean 
values. Included in this new data set were the MOEs used for this experiment: mean T-
Craft Survival Rate and mean Number of T-Craft Ashore. The mean T-Craft Survival 
Rate tracks the ratio between the number of T-Craft at the start of the simulation against 
the number of T-Craft at the end of the simulation run. Mean Number of T-Craft Ashore 
tracks the number of T-Craft landings on shore. The same process was used to set up the 
data used in the second stage design, which results in 513 rows of mean values.  
B. INSIGHTS INTO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In Chapter I, two questions were presented as the basis of this research. Those two 
questions are restated in paragraphs that follow. Each question is addressed and explored 
through data analysis. In an attempt to be as thorough as possible, analysis was conducted 
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using several analytical and statistical tools. Regression models and prediction plots are a 
few of the tools that are used and discussed in this chapter. The chapter closes with 
insights gained as a result of this analysis. 
Regression analysis is used to identify significant factors that contribute to the 
desired MOE. The R-squared or adjusted R-squared values are examined to assess the 
adequacy of the model developed through regression analysis. R-squared is a statistic that 
measures the proportion of the variability in the MOE explained by the fitted model. A 
high R-squared indicates a close match between the fitted model and the MOE. A major 
concern with using R-squared is that there is no penalty for adding variables to the model. 
R-squared will increase as variables are added, whether the added variable is significant 
or not. However, the adjusted R-squared does not always increase as a result of simply 
adding variables to the model. The adjusted R-squared will only increase if the addition 
of the variable to the model reduces the residual mean square. The reduction in error 
often signifies that that variable is important and should be in the model (Montgomery, 
Peck, & Vining, 2006). The adjusted R-squared is the statistic that is used when assessing 
a regression model in this research.  
The prediction plot is part of the regression output provided by the software 
package JMP8. The plots show the significant variables identified by the developed 
model. Each plot can be adjusted to see how the adjustment affects the predicted 
response. This tool is very useful in highlighting the relationships between the main 
effects in the fitted model (JMP8, 2009).     
1. Does the Transformable Craft Need an Organic Weapon System? 
This section addresses the survivability of the T-Craft. Factors such as having 
weapons or not, having escorts or not, and using prescribed tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) or not in a threat environment are explored for each scenario. The 
default escort mix (Escort[1]) is five LCS_SW, two LCS_ASW, and four MH-60s. The 




patrol boats are detected. When the T-Craft detects enemy patrol boats it will return to the 
seabase until the threat is no longer present. Appendix C contains all designs and 
description of each variable. 
a. Colombia Scenario 
In order to explore the above-mentioned factors and its effects on the 
MOE, T-Craft Survival Rate, and Number of T-Craft Ashore, a regression model was 
developed using all input factors as predictors. The actual versus predicted plot depicted 
in Figure 17 shows that Escort, Return to Seabase (the use of the TTP), Speed, and Semi-
Submersibles are statistically significant and explain 90 percent of the variability in the 
mean T-Craft survival rate. It is also important to note that the errors in this plot and the 
ones to follow are not normal, so significance tests are not exact. However, the p-values 
that are used are so low that the variables in the fitted models are significant. 
In addition to identifying the variability in the model and the significant 
factors of the model, regression analysis also identifies those factors that have more 
statistical significance in the model. The higher the absolute value of the t-ratio, the more 
significant it is to the outcome of the MOE. For example, in Figure 17, Escorts[0], and 
Return to Seabase[0] are the most significant variables in the model. The negative 
coefficient associated with these variables means that the presence of these variables has 
a negative effect on the MOE. Therefore, without Escorts and the TTP the survivability 
of the T-Craft is significantly reduced. In addition, looking at the estimate column of the 
same figure shows by what amount the variable affects the MOE. Thus, in this case, the 
absence of Escorts (Escorts[0]) reduces the survivability of the T-Craft by 26 percent. 
Likewise, increasing the number of semi-submersibles in the fitted model reduces on 
average the survivability of the T-Craft by 4.9 percent per semi-submersible. The three 
highlighted outliers in the prediction plot represent the missions where escorts were not 
present and the number of enemy was minimal. This situation is one of the rare times that 
T-Craft survivability was high and escorts were not present.  
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Figure 17.   Regression plot and parameter estimates for the mean T-Craft Survival 
rate in the Colombia scenario question 1. 
It is important to note that there is an interaction between Escorts and the 
TTP Return to Seabase. An interaction indicates that the change in the MOE caused by 
varying one parameter is dependent upon the value of another parameter. In an 
interaction plot, the MOE is on the y-axis and the factors involved in the interaction are 
on the x-axis and appear as separate lines. The matrix plot containing the interactions 
shows the high and low levels of the factor on the row and the trend in the MOE by 
changing the factor in the column. Evidence of interactions is shown as nonparallel lines 
(JMP8, 2009). Figure 18 shows the interaction effects for the fitted model with the 
survival MOE. The upper section in the figure shows the interaction between Escorts and 
Return to Seabase. From the figure, the following insights are gained: 
• When Escorts are not present (red line) and the TTP is not used 
(0), the mean T-Craft Survivability rate is below one percent. 
• When Escorts are not present and the TTP is used (1), the mean T-
Craft Survivability rate rises above 50 percent. 
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• When Escorts are present (blue line) and the TTP is not used (0), 
the mean T-Craft Survivability rate rises to approximately 90 
percent. 
• When Escorts are present (blue line) and the TTP is not used (1), 
the mean T-Craft Survivability remains at approximately 90 
percent. 
The lower section displays the same relationship with the interaction terms. This finding 
shows that when the escorts are present the use of the TTP is statistically insignificant. 
This result is important because it signifies that if escorts are present there is no need to 
implement the TTP. The use of escorts alone increases the survivability of the T-Craft.  
 
Figure 18.   Interaction profile for the MOE mean T-Craft Survival Rate. The plot 
shows the interaction effects between Escorts and Return to Seabase for the 
Colombia scenario question 1. 
Figure 19 shows the statistically significant variables that explain 89 
percent of the variability in the mean number of T-Craft ashore. Both MOEs have factors 
in common, but, as can be seen, Number of T-Craft, Speed, and Red Patrol Boats are also 
significant in the later regression model. Also, the fitted model shows that there is an 
interaction between Escorts and Return to Seabase. The behavior in this model is much 
like the behavior in the previous model in that the presence of escorts produces the 
highest number of T-Craft ashore. So, when escorts are available, the TTP should not be 
used. Figure 20 graphs B and D show this relationship. 
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Figure 19.   Regression plot and parameter estimates for the mean Number of T-Craft 
Ashore in the Colombia scenario question 1. 
Figure 20 also shows another interaction relationship that seems somewhat 
intuitive. This interaction is between Escorts and Red Patrol Boats (graphs A and C). 
From graph A the following insights are obtained: 
• When Escorts are not present (red line) and there are zero Red 
Patrol Boats, the number of T-Craft Ashore is greater than 10. 
(Semi-submersibles are present in the model) 
• When Escorts are not present and there are 10 Red Patrol Boats, 
the number of T-Craft Ashore drops to zero. 
• When Escorts are present (blue line) and there are zero Red Patrol 
Boats, the number of T-Craft Ashore is greater than 20. 
• When Escorts are present (blue line) and there are 10 Red Patrol 
Boats, the number of T-Craft Ashore is greater than 20. 
Graph C depicts the same relationship. This interaction shows that the number of T-Craft 
Ashore is greater than 20 regardless of the number of Red Patrol Boats. Without escorts 
the number of T-Craft ashore drops significantly. This interaction relationship reinforces 
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the importance of escorts in a threat environment. It translates to mission success in that 
more T-Craft ashore means more combat power or sustainment ashore. 
 
Figure 20.   Interaction profile for the MOE mean Number of T-Craft Ashore. The plot 
shows the interaction effects in the fitted model for the Colombia scenario 
question 1. 
After running this scenario, the variable Armed is not significant to either 
MOE. This finding means that the survivability of the T-Craft or number of T-Craft 
ashore is not significantly dependent on having a weapon system on board in this 
scenario. The presence of the escorts or the use of the TTP was sufficient in keeping the 
T-Craft safe. Figure 21 shows a one-way analysis of variance plot (ANOVA) depicting 
the relationship between the three variables: Armed, Escorts, and Return to Seabase, and 
the survivability MOE. It also contains density plots that compare variable distributions 
and how they affect survivability. The red line in the plot represents the variable being 
inactive. The blue line represents the variable being active. The green diamonds in the 
plot represents the mean value of the variable over the distribution in that state. So, for 
example, the green diamonds in the Armed graph shows the mean survival rate with or 
without weapons as 60 percent. ANOVA tests allow the testing of two or more variables 
and the comparison of means in order to identify how a continuous response (MOE) 
distributes differently across groups defined by the variables. More information can be 
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found in the user manual of JMP8. The overlapping lines in the figure reinforce the point 
that Armed in this scenario was not significant.  
 
Figure 21.   ANOVA plots of the MOE mean T-Craft Survival Rate and the variables 
Armed, Escorts, and Return to Seabase. 
b. Malaysia Scenario 
The analysis for the Malaysia scenario was conducted in much the same 
manner as the Colombia scenario. However, in this scenario a different threat is present 
and the distance to the shore has been significantly increased. As a result, the variables 
Escorts, Armed, Red Patrol Boat, Swarm, and Speed appear to be significant, explaining 
87 percent of the variability in the MOE mean T-Craft Survival Rate. Similar to the 
findings in the Colombia scenario, escorts are the most significant factor in increasing the 
survivability of the T-Craft. In addition, the T-Craft being armed also contributes 
significantly to the survivability rate of the T-Craft. The T-Craft being armed is 
significant in this scenario because of the pure surface threat. Unlike the Colombia 
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scenario, where the semi-submersibles are hard to detect, the swarm craft are much easier 
to detect. Figure 22 shows the actual versus predicted plot and the sorted parameters for 
the MOE mean T-Craft Survival Rate.  
 
Figure 22.   Regression plot and parameter estimates for the MOE mean T-Craft 
Survival Rate in the Malaysia scenario question 1. 
As for the MOE Number of T-Craft Ashore, 85 percent of the variability is 
explained by the following variables: Escorts, Number of T-Craft, Speed, and Armed. 
Again, the T-Craft being armed proved to be significant. Figure 23 shows the actual 




Figure 23.   Regression plot and parameter estimates for the MOE mean Number of T-
Craft Ashore in the Malaysia scenario question 1. 
The Malaysia scenario contains several interaction terms. Escorts are a 
consistent variable in all of the interaction terms. In each interaction, survivability 
increases when escorts are present. One interaction term that was of particular interest 
was the interaction between the variables Armed, and Escorts. This interaction was 
significant to both fitted models and it was interesting to see if it had the same properties 
as the Escort and Return to Seabase interaction in the previous scenario. Figure 24 shows 
that the interaction relationship between Armed and Escorts is additive. Having both 
features enhances both the survivability of the T-Craft and the number of T-Craft ashore.  
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Figure 24.   ANOVA chart of the MOE mean T-Craft Survival Rate showing the 
relation between the variables Armed and Escorted. 
c. Summary 
The intent of question one was to address whether the T-Craft should be 
armed or not, escorted or not, and armed and escorted or not. From the analysis of the 
Colombia and Malaysia scenarios, the use of escorts proved to be significant in both 
scenarios. The presence of escorts in both models improved both MOEs. The default 
vessel mix for escorts was: five LCS_SWs, two LCS_ASWs, and four MH-60s. The 
answer to the question of the T-Craft being armed was clear in the Malaysia scenario. 
However, in the Colombia scenario, the T-Craft having a weapon system did not appear 
to have a significant effect on either MOE. This finding is a result of the strong escort 
presence in the Colombia scenario and the subsurface threat in that environment. The 
Malaysia scenario contained a pure surface threat, and as a result, both variables Armed 
and Escorted proved to be significant. With that, the next section will carry this 
information forward in the attempt to further identify a good T-Craft employment method 
in these types of environments.  
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2. How Should the Transformable Craft be Employed When a Threat 
Exists? 
The analysis in this section is geared toward gaining insights into how the T-Craft 
should be employed when a threat exists. The data are explored to identify any indicators 
as to what mix of escort vehicles will increase the survivability of the T-Craft, or which 
weapon system of the two recommended has the greater impact on T-Craft survivability. 
The analysis for this section includes a few more variables that helped explore many 
more relationships within each scenario. Each scenario is covered in turn.   
a. Colombia Scenario 
The run of the Colombia scenario produced the following results. With the 
increased number of variables, the output contained several more variables that appear to 
be significant to the MOE mean T-Craft Survival Rate. Figure 25 shows the prediction 
plot and sorted parameter list that lists the factors that explain 83 percent of the 
variability in the MOE describing T-Craft survivability. From the figure, it is possible to 
see that the semi-submersible threat is very significant insofar as it impacts the 
survivability of the T-Craft. As for the controllable factors, the MH-60 is the most 
significant factor listed. Based on the characteristics of the MH-60, it ranks very high due 
to its ability to detect and engage the enemy along the shoreline, as well as to detect and 
engage enemy threats at sea. The MH-60 flies a search pattern that allows it to go close 
enough to shore to detect semi-submersibles and that also allows it to fly along the sea-
lanes to pick up any other enemy presence. Other controllable factors that appear to be 
significant are Speed, the Number of T-Craft, and LCSs.  
In order to gain insights into the performance of the weapon systems, the 
variables Weapon 1 (MK110) and Weapon 2 (30mm cannon) are included in the 
regression model. The two variables have a high p-value, which indicates that they do not 
have a statistically significant impact on the MOE. However, there are still insights to be 
gained by examining these two variables. The parameter list shows that Weapon 1 has a 
positive coefficient, while Weapon 2 has a negative coefficient. The positive coefficient 
means that when weapon one is active in the model the MOE mean T-Craft Survival Rate 
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is slightly improved. The negative coefficient on Weapon 2 results in a decrease in the 
survivability MOE when Weapon 2 is the only active weapon. This result is because 
Weapon 1 has a much higher effective range and higher rate of fire than Weapon 2. With 
this information, if forced to choose, the recommendation would be for Weapon 1. 
 
Figure 25.   Regression plot and parameter estimates for the mean T-Craft Survival 
Rate in the Colombia scenario question 2. 
While the number of friendly vessels all have a positive coefficient 
associated with them in the fitted model, it is interesting to see that speed has a negative 
coefficient. As speed increases past 30 knots, the MOE begins to decrease below 90 
percent. This fact is interesting because speed was thought to be the main factor that 
would improve the survivability of the T-craft. Figure 26 shows the plot of the speed 
distribution and its impact on T-Craft survivability. The plot provides a more detailed 
look at the relationship between speed and survivability. Each dot in the plot represents 
the mean survival rate of a simulated mission. The red line depicts the mean survival rate 
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over the entire distribution. The green line connects the means of the different factor 
levels. As speed increases from 20 knots survivability decreases. At speeds above 30 
knots, the survivability decreases below the mean. Also, at speeds greater than 30 knots 
there is more variance in the distribution, i.e., more dots appear further away from the 
mean. Therefore, the recommended operating range of the T-Craft when a threat is 
present appears to be between 20 and 30 knots, in this scenario. In this speed range, the 
T-Craft is traveling with its escorts and not outrunning them. Traveling within this speed 
range increases the likelihood of a protective barrier around the T-Craft as it conducts its 
mission.     
 
Figure 26.   Distribution plot showing the relation between Speed and the MOE mean 
T-Craft Survival Rate.  
The analysis of the MOE mean Number of T-Craft Ashore produced 
similar results to those of the survivability MOE. Figure 27 shows the predicted plot and 
parameters that explain 88 percent of the variability in the MOE. It is interesting to find 
that, unlike the survivability MOE, Speed is positively correlated to the number of T-
Craft ashore. As speed increases, more T-Craft will land ashore. The prediction profiler 
shows that speeds in excess of 35 knots generate only a few more T-Craft ashore than at 
slower speeds. This finding results from the T-Craft outrunning their escorts and being 
exposed to enemy actions; it further confirms the previously-stated recommended 
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operating range. Figure 28 shows the relationship with speed and number of T-Craft 
ashore using the prediction profiler. The profiler highlights the diminishing return speed 
has on the number of T-Craft ashore. As speed is increased from 25 to 35 knots, the 
number of T- Craft ashore rises by four. Increasing speed from 35 to 45 knots only results 
in an increase of two more T-Craft ashore.   
 
 
Figure 27.   Regression plot and parameter estimates for the mean Number of T-Craft 
Ashore in the Colombia scenario question 2. 
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Figure 28.   Prediction plots for the MOE mean Number of T-Craft Ashore. This graph 
compares the relationship between Speed and the number of T-Craft ashore. 
In answering the first question, a default mix of escort vehicles was 
determined and used for each simulation run. In this section, a closer look is taken at each 
escort entity in order to determine an effective mix to improve T-Craft survivability. 
Figure 29 reflects the distribution plots of each of the escort vehicles and their impact on 
T-Craft survivability. The red line represents the mean survivability across the entire 
distribution. The green line connects the factors at each point. There is a significant 
increase in survivability when the number of LCS_SW increases from one to two and the 
number of MH-60s increase from three to four. The increase in survivability with the 
LCS_ASW appears to be most significant when there are at least three present. In order 
to maintain a higher T-Craft survival rate, there should be: at least two LCS_SW, but four 
or more LCS_SW are preferred; three or more LCS_ASW; and five or more MH-60s. 
Using these values creates a survivability rate of about 90 percent or higher in the 
stressing scenario models. 
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Figure 29.   Distribution plots of the mean T-Craft Survival Rate and LCS_SW, 
LCS_ASW, and MH-60s in the Colombia scenario. The plot shows the 
recommended range when determining escort mix.  
The process was repeated when trying to determine the optimum number 
of T-Craft. Figure 30 shows the relationship between the number of T-Craft and T-Craft 
survivability. This plot shows that when the number of T-Craft is greater than ten, 
survivability is highest.  
 
Figure 30.   Distribution plots of the mean T-Craft Survival Rate and number of T-
Craft. The plots show the recommended range when determining number of T-
Craft. 
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b. Malaysia Scenario 
As before, the Malaysia scenario is different from the Colombia scenario. 
The seabase in this scenario is 150 nm from shore and the threat is purely surface. Due to 
the questions that are being addressed, the number of factors in this scenario was 
increased as well. Figure 31 shows the predicted plot and sorted parameters that explain 
72 percent of the variability in the survivability MOE. In this model, the controllable 
factor LCS_SW appears to be the most significant factor. The factor LCS_SW is 
followed by the MH-60. In this scenario, both factors are able to effectively engage the 
enemy threat. Unlike the semi-submersibles that are almost undetectable by the LCSs due 
to range, the swarm craft are easily detected by the LCSs. As before, the MH-60 flies in a 
search pattern that allows it to detect and engage enemy threats along the coast, as well as 
out to sea. The regression model for the MOE mean Number of T-Craft Ashore looks 
very similar to the survivability model.  
 
Figure 31.   Regression plot and parameter estimates for the T-Craft Survival Rate in 
the Malaysia scenario question 2. 
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The findings in the Malaysia scenario show each factor having a similar 
relationship as found in the Colombia scenario with respect to speed, i.e., as speed 
increases past 33 knots, T-Craft survival rate starts to decrease. As for the number of T-
Craft and escorts, the numbers are also close to the same. Figure 32 shows the 
relationship between the distributions of the escorts with the survival MOE and the 
relationship of the T-Craft and the survival MOE. With seven or more T-Craft, two or 
more LCS_SW, five or more MH-60s, and one or more LCS_ASW, a survival rate of 
approximately 90 percent or higher will be maintained with a significant threat present. In 
this scenario, as in the Colombia scenario, there is a significant jump in survival rate 
when the LCS_SW rises from one to two. The rise in survivability is a result of the 
enemy threat coming from multiple directions. Having two or more LCS_SWs were 
needed to create a protective lane through which the T-Craft could transit.    
 
Figure 32.   Distribution plots of the mean T-Craft Survival Rate and T-Craft 
LCS_SW, LCS_ASW, and MH-60s in the Malaysia scenario. The plot shows the 
number at which survivability increases beyond 90 percent. 
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The weapon systems performed as anticipated in this scenario. Having 
both weapons active was most significant. However, Weapon 1 appeared more effective 
against the swarm and patrol boat threat. From the parameter list in Figure 33, active 
Weapon (2 – 1&3) means that Weapon 2 had very little impact on the survivability of the 
T-Craft, as compared to Weapon 1 or both being used. In this scenario the targets were at 
a greater range and Weapon System 1 has a longer effective range. This capability 
allowed for the T-Craft to engage targets at a much greater distance.  
c. Summary 
The initial intent of question two was to find mixes of weapon systems 
and escort vehicles that will enhance the survivability of the T-Craft when a threat exists. 
In conducting the analysis of the question it was discovered that Weapon 1 was most 
effective in protecting the T-Craft in each of the scenarios. The attributes of speed turned 
out to be counterintuitive; speed was initially thought to be the main contributor to the 
survivability of the T-Craft. However, the case is that when a threat is present, it is better 
for the T-Craft to stay with its escorts in order to best perform its mission. The 
recommended number of escorts, and T-Craft were close if not the same in each scenario. 
In the Colombia scenario, the numbers were ten or more T-Craft, two or more LCS_SW, 
three or more LCS_ASW and five or more MH-60s; and in the Malaysia scenario, seven 
or more T-Craft, two or more LCS_SW, one or more LCS_ASW, and five or more MH-
60s. These resulted in survival rates of over 90 percent in each scenario.  
C. FURTHER INSIGHTS 
This section addresses some important points that emerged during the analysis. 
Each point was consistent throughout the analysis of each question, and proved to be 
points of interest as conclusions and insights were developed. This highlights one of the 
main characteristics of data farming. So much information was varied and run through 
the models that in looking for one data point, several more nuggets of information were 
discovered. This information proved to be both useful and relevant, especially in 
understanding the significance of shoreline threats of semi-submersibles and swarm craft. 
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1. Semi-submersibles 
The semi-submersible threat is much like that of the improvised explosive devices 
(IED) currently being used in the combat zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. If forces are 
deployed to an area where this threat is present, measures must be taken to defeat the 
threat. After the results of the experimental designs were analyzed, a smaller follow-on 
study was conducted to see if there was a way to improve T-Craft survivability against 
semi-submersibles. The design simulated a more sophisticated communication and 
identification capability that is linked to the weapon system. The results of the analysis 
show that by improving sensors and communication links on the T-Craft, the 
survivability of the T-Craft increased. Figure 33 shows these results. The red line 
represents the effectiveness of the T-Craft weapons against the semi-submersibles 
without communication links, and the blue line represents the effectiveness of the 
weapons with communications links. Weapon 1 appears to be more effective than 
Weapon 2. 
 
Figure 33.   ANOVA plot showing the relation between Semi-submersibles and the 
effectiveness of weapons with or without a communication link. 
2. Swarm Craft 
In the Malaysia scenario, the coastal swarm boats turned out to be the most 
significant threat. Under normal operations, the LCS would not go in waters shallower 
than 30 ft due to its draft. In an attempt to accurately display this restriction, the LCSs 
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were programmed to stop approximately six miles short of the shoreline in order to 
simulate the restriction. However, since this is a modeling environment, the restriction 
was overridden at times when the LCS detected an enemy threat and pursued it. This 
situation is a concern because in the same six-mile threshold the T-Craft is likely to 
conduct its transformations from SES to ACV and back. The transformation is another 
function that leaves the T-Craft vulnerable. This situation seemingly creates a zone 
approximately six to ten miles off the coast that leaves the T-Craft most vulnerable to 
attack. Further tests should be done to model the shoreline region in order to see if 
restrictions on the LCS cause the threat to be more significant and, if so, what courses of 
action can be taken to address this problem. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
This research set out to determine how best to protect the T-Craft in a hostile 
environment. The T-Craft was modeled with weapons, LCS escorts, and MH-60s as a 
means of enhancing survivability. Through the use of realistic scenario simulations, this 
study produced detailed analysis regarding the escort size and composition, along with 
the effects of weapon systems as it pertains to T-Craft survival. It also provided a 
framework for the future use of agent-based models, such as MANA, in exploring similar 
or related topics. The results of this thesis provide insights into how the T-Craft should be 
deployed. Furthermore, the simulation built for this research can serve as the foundation 
for many additional studies. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Seabasing is developing as a dominant concept for military operations in the 21st 
century and will be at the core of joint operations abroad. The T-Craft is intended to 
provide “game-changing capabilities” for seabasing operations, substantially 
outperforming any seabase connector in the Navy’s current inventory. Through the use of 
simulation, state-of-the-art experimental design, and advanced data analysis, over 
200,000 seabasing missions were analyzed by varying the number of T-Craft, its 
capabilities (e.g., speed), the types of weapon systems it carries, its tactics, as well as 
escort mixes and threat level, in order to determine what combinations obtain the highest 
survivability and throughput rate for the T-Craft. From the analysis of the scenarios 
conducted in Chapter IV, the following conclusions were made. 
1. Should the T-Craft Have Its Own Organic Weapons System? 
The answer to the question of the T-Craft being armed was clear in the Malaysia 
scenario. However, in the Colombia scenario, the T-Craft having a weapon system did 
not appear to have a significant effect on either MOE. This finding is a result of the 
subsurface threat in that environment and the robust escort package. The Malaysia 
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scenario contained a pure surface threat, and both variables armed and escorted proved to 
be significant. Through further analysis, the T-Craft being armed did in fact improve 
survivability. Because of its range and volume of fire, the MK110 57mm (Weapon 1) had 
more of an impact on T-Craft survivability than the 30 mm cannon (Weapon 2) in the 
scenarios examined.  
2. How Should the T-Craft Be Employed When a Threat Exists? 
All of the scenarios in this research produced the same results with respect to the 
effects of escorts in relation to T-Craft survivability and number of T-Craft ashore. 
Having escorts present significantly increased both measures. Specifically, having more 
than two LCS_SWs substantially increased T-Craft survivability. Further analysis of 
these particular scenarios yielded the following results. When a surface and subsurface 
threat is present the recommended number of T-Craft is ten or more with an escort mix 
of: two or more LCS_SW, three or more LCS_ASW, and six or more MH-60s. With a 
pure surface threat, the recommended number of T-Craft is seven or more with an escort 
mix of two or more LCS_SW, one or more LCS_ASW, and five or more MH-60s. If 
there are no escorts, but a threat exists, the T-Craft should incorporate the TTP return to 
seabase. 
Because speed appeared to be significant in each run, it is important to address as 
well. From the analysis, the operating speed of the T-Craft must be determined by the 
operating capabilities of the escorts. When a threat is present, the T-Craft should travel 
with its escort vehicles. Because the top speed of the LCS is 40 knots, the T-Craft should 
not exceed that speed. Therefore, regarding speed, the optimal operating range for the T-
Craft is between 25 and 30 knots when using the LCSs as an escort. It is important to 
note that the recommended range is still faster than the current inventory of seabase 
connectors. 
Finally, the shoreline threat remains a critical area in ensuring T-Craft 
survivability. In the scenarios examined, the LCSs could only travel within six miles of 
the shoreline due to their draft. The area between the shoreline and six miles out is where 
the semi-submersibles and swarm boats were most prevalent in each scenario. That area 
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also represents the region where the T-Craft transforms from SES to ACV as it transits to 
shore and from ACV back to SES as it transits back to the seabase. The transition times 
are approximately 45 minutes to one hour, leaving the T-Craft more vulnerable. This area 
needs further examination. 
C. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
The findings of this thesis are based on the modeled environment. At the time of 
model development, there were numerous assumptions about the T-Craft and its 
capabilities. In May 2010 Alion, Textron, and Umoe Mandal presented their Phase II 
design developments to ONR. With each presentation came better information on the 
performance capabilities of the T-Craft. Further studies should be developed leveraging 
this information to better refine the T-Craft attributes in the current model or other 
modeling environments to see if there are significant changes.  
The scenario assumed air superiority and did not include a deep-water subsurface 
threat. In addition, the modeled LCS_ASW did not include its complete mix of sensors. 
Adding more detail to the model in the form of enemy threat and friendly capabilities 
may uncover more information not captured in this thesis. With that, the following are 
recommendations for follow-on research: 
• Analysis of the impact of an air or subsurface threat in the T-Craft 
operating area. 
• Analysis of the coastal region where the T-Craft transforms from SES to 
ACV to see if other vessels are needed to augment the LCS role in force 
protection to reduce Blue force casualties. 
• Further analysis of sensors and weapon systems. 
• The modeling and simulation of shore missile threats against Blue forces 
operating in a littoral or near littoral combat environment.   
• Develop other scenarios, for example, an inter-agency scenario (i.e., U.S. 
military, Homeland Defense, and Red Cross) where the T-Craft is 
conducting operations in response to a natural disaster.  
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APPENDIX A. SCENARIOS 
The scenarios in this thesis were taken directly from the article Transformable 
Craft Throughput: A Requirements Analysis (Helland, Jimenez, & Rowden, 2009).  
A. SOUTH AMERICA—PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
1. Background 
The year is 2025, and the Colombian Civil War has raged in the country for sixty 
years. The current elected president Mario Gutierrez Pedroza assumed the presidency of 
Colombia after a record low voter turnout. It appears that the people of Colombia have 
lost total confidence in the democratic process and the Colombian Government. The 
Colombian economy is experiencing the worst crisis the country has seen. The level of 
violence in the country is unprecedented. During the past two years guerrillas and the San 
José Cartel has murdered approximately 1,800 public officials including town mayors, 
federal and state legislators, judges, and prosecutors. More than 17,000 people have been 
killed in 420 recorded massacres. 
The San José Cartel was born from the ashes of the Medellin and Cali Cartels, 
which were virtually dismantled in the year 2007. In early 2012, a new drug called 
“magia” (magic) first appeared in the U.S. Months later, magic made its debut in the 
European Union and Asia. The drug is a stimulant that accelerates physical and mental 
states, produces euphoria, and eases physical and mental pain. In many cases, the user is 
prone to violent behavior. Today, the use of magic has reached epidemic proportions. It is 
estimated that in the U.S. there are more than 15 million addicts and an estimated 80 
million worldwide. The death toll in the U.S. attributed directly or indirectly to the use of 
magic has surpassed 500,000 since the appearance of the drug in 2012. 
With the advent of magic, the San José cartel has been able to establish an 
alliance with the Colombian insurgency movement, in particular the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Soon after the 2013 government campaign against 
the rebels, the National Liberation Army (ELN) joined forces with the FARC, and the 
Common Front for the Liberation of Colombia (CFLC) was born. Today, the CFLC has 
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become the security force for the San José Cartel. The CFLC has taken advantage of 
increased drug revenue to build up their conventional arsenal, largely purchased from 
neighboring Venezuela. Last year, the annual CFLC income was estimated at over U.S. 
$800 million. 
The current situation in Colombia has taken its toll not only on the U.S., but also 
in the region. The political and economic instability of the neighboring countries has 
ignited the formation of a series of new narco-guerrilla groups. The violence is rapidly 
spreading to neighboring Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. With their considerable arsenal 
and forces, the objective of the San José Cartel and the CFLC is to continue to disrupt 
and eventually to overthrow the Colombian Government. The CFLC desires to establish a 
government that will allow the San José Cartel to continue to massively export magic 
worldwide, but particularly to the United States.   
2. Scenario 
In the last two years, the CFLC has practically crippled the Colombian Armed 
Forces. In a coordinated attack, CFLC forces infiltrated four air force bases and destroyed 
most of the aircraft. Only the airbases at Barranquilla and Santa Maria were able to 
minimize the damage inflicted by the CFLC. The naval base at Puerto Tamuco was also 
attacked and the guerrillas seized 37 out of 41 patrol craft. Intelligence reported the 
possible deployment of floating mines in the ports of Buenaventura and Tamuco. Those 
reports were later confirmed by the sinking of the merchant ship Tulango after a mine 
explosion 37 miles NW of Buenaventura. The Colombian Army has also suffered a series 
of devastating blows that practically left the CFLC in control of Colombia south of the 4th 
parallel. In addition, the CFLC has systematically destroyed most of the transportation 
infrastructure west of the Cordillera (Andes Mountains). The few usable roads are under 
heavy guerrilla guard and practically unsuitable for the transportation of heavy 
equipment. 
The United Nations Security Council has held several meetings over the 
instability in the region. The U.S. has sought a resolution (NSCR) calling for a U.N. 
peacekeeping force to restore the failed government, eliminate the CFLC and other 
cartels, and deal a blow to the drug trade by supporting stability and security to the 
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region. However, Russia, as Venezuela’s ally, has vetoed these efforts alleging that “U.S. 
imperialists are seeking to restore their former oppressed provinces.” Russia claims 
Venezuela is capable of leading a “Latin Partnership” capable of restoring security to the 
region, despite Venezuela’s part in supplying the cartels. 
3. Action 
The U.S. intends to unilaterally insert a force capable of securing the country, 
destroying the drug cartels, resisting possible Venezuelan influence, and ultimately 
restoring a democratic government.   
Elements of the 7th Special Forces Group will utilize El Dorado International 
Airport as an APOD to quickly enter the capital city of Bogota in order to reestablish a 
Colombian security force, conduct counter insurgency operations, and secure the city to 
enable an interim government to be established.   
Conventional forces to be inserted include the Second MEB embarked on the Iwo 
Jima Expeditionary Strike Force, the Tenth Mountain Division, and the First Cavalry 
Division. The MEB will be inserted, utilizing ARG connectors near the city of Covenas. 
The geographic proximity to Venezuela will provide a deterrent from that country 
sending troops into Colombia.   
Meanwhile, Army units will primarily be transported ashore via T-Craft, near the 
town of Tumaco on the southern coast, in order to take advantage of the highway network 
that originates in the area. Forces shall be staged at a sea base 50 miles offshore. Initial 
objectives are known or suspected cartel operation areas. Troops will drive inland to meet 
up with Ecuadorian troops acting as advisors and translators to U.S. forces. Utilizing 
these advisors to gain information on cartel operations, U.S. troops shall continue to 
determine cartel operation areas, secure them, and restore local law enforcement 




B. SOUTH EAST ASIA – REGIONAL CONFLICT 
1. Background 
The Kalimantan Republic became an independent nation in October 2002, when 
General Gegwan Riady proclaimed that the four Indonesian provinces on Borneo were 
seceding from Indonesia to create a new republic. The secession was justified by claims 
that the Jakarta government was inadequately providing for the economic well-being of 
the Kalimantan people. Riady claimed specifically that the central government’s failure 
to invest in Kalimantan infrastructure, as opposed to the enormous wealth exported from 
the southern island’s reported vast petroleum stores. The Jakarta government, unable to 
counter Riady’s move, grudgingly acceded to Kalimantan’s declaration of independence. 
After the accession, the Kalimantan Republic was generally accepted internationally, 
including by the United States. 
However, in the recent years the Kalimantan Republic has suffered a reversal in 
its economic fortunes since the collapse of the world petroleum market. Economic 
worries deepened when improved survey techniques discovered that previous estimates 
of Kalimantan’s offshore energy reserves had been grossly overestimated.  Now seriously 
overextended, the Riady government suspended most of its “New Kalimantan” 
initiatives, including a number of tourism and infrastructure-related construction and 
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development projects. Suspension of these projects has led to 40 percent unemployment.  
This unemployment and intermittent civil disturbances, including food-line riots and 
dramatically increased level of crime, has hit the larger cities of Kalimantan. 
Riady sought financial aid from Malaysia and Brunei. But, with Kalimantan’s 
dept now totaling nearly $12 billion, neither of its neighbors was willing to extend either 
outright grants or unsecured loans to the struggling nation. This denial led to public 
denouncements by Riady, alleging that the “affluent” north had turned its back on their 
“brothers to the south.”  Riady swore to correct the “blatant and discriminatory economic 
inequality” that exists between the north and south. Over the course of a few months, 
“One Borneo, One Nation” became not just a diplomatic theme; it also became the 
central focus of Kalimantan (KA) military planning. 
2. Scenario 
Hostilities commenced shortly after a public statement by Riady that Malaysia 
had been using offshore oil terminals to steal petroleum from Kalimantan fields.  He 
stated that Kalimantan would not sit idly by as the discriminatory north stole the very 
resources that it had refused to help develop. He made a call on the “Iban,” a Malaysian 
separatist movement, to help Kalimantan in the coming fight for economic equality.  
Immediately after the public address, two Kalimantan army divisions began using air and 
amphibious forces to gain footholds in Malaysia. The First Kalimantan Division (KD) 
landed near Kuching and began driving west through Malaysian territory.  The Third KD 
moved into Sandakan on the east coast of Malaysia, and began driving west towards 
Brunei. Reportedly, KA naval forces laid sea mines in the Trusan Strait, effectively 
blocking Malaysian, and Brunei naval forces. 
It is believed that KA forces are taking an operational pause to restructure their 
positions before advancing inland. Two divisions remain in the south, near the 
Kalimantan capital of Banjarmasin. While one is expected to remain near the capital, 
naval movements suggest the other may be used to reinforce units in place before the 
main force advances. Malaysian and Brunei forces, outnumbered by the well-equipped 
KA divisions, were forced to fall back to defensive positions.  Two Malaysian brigades 
are emplaced near Bitulu, along the First KD’s expected line of advance.  Two additional 
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Malyasian brigades are near the city of Kota Kinabalu, blocking the Third KD drive 
towards Brunei. Two battalions of Brunei troops are located in the capital city of Bandar 
Seri Begawan. 
Malaysia is requesting U.S. assistance in preventing further loss of territory until 
it can mobilize troops to remove KA forces occupied in the region. The mobilization and 
movement of Malaysian troops is expected to take up to 120 days. 
3. Action 
The U.S. will reinforce Malaysian units in order to deter further KA expedition 
and to support blue forces should deterrence fail. The Tenth Mountain Division will 
support forces near Kota Kinabalu, while the Third MEB will support forces near 
Bintulu. The threat of sea mines will prevent the use of the major SPODs until MCM 
assets can clear the restricted waterways.  As such, forces will arrive via T-Craft to beach 
heads near friendly forces.  The seabase will consist of two MPF(F) squadrons, colocated 
to reduce naval security presence.  The MPF(F) ships will stage the U.S. divisions and 






APPENDIX B. PERSONALITIES AND CAPABILITIES OF 
AGENTS 
 
A. RED FORCES 
Red force patrol boat and swarm boat information was obtained from The Naval 
Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, (15th ed.) (Wertheim, 2007). Semi-
submersible information was obtained from the Global Security.org Web site at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/spss.htm. 
1. Colombia 
a. Patrol Boat 
 
The patrol boat used in the Colombia scenario is modeled after the 
Venezuelan Navanita class patrol boat. The boats patrol the coastal regions as the first 
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line defense of the drug cartels. The T-Craft is the primary target of this vessel. When a 
T-Craft is detected, the patrol craft increases its speed from the cruising speed of 25 knots 
to 35 knots in order to attack the T-Craft. If the patrol force encounters the LCS, its 
secondary target, the patrol craft will continue in the attack. The detection range of this 
vessel is 20 nm and the classification range is 15 nm. 
b. Semi-submersibles 
 
The semi-submersibles in this scenario are modeled after a typical 
Colombian semi-submersible drug boat. These boats can hold up to ten tons of cocaine. 
For the purpose of this scenario, explosives replace the cocaine, representing an 
improvised explosive device along the shoreline. The semi-submersibles are guided by 
remote control and remain in the water until they explode or are destroyed. The T-Craft is 
the primary target of the semi-submersible. If the remote signal is lost, semi-submersibles 
are capable of leaving the coastline and therefore representing a threat to the LCS.   
2. Malaysia  
a. Patrol Boat 
 
The patrol boat used in the Malaysia scenario is modeled after the French 
PR-72 560 class patrol boat. The boats patrol the coastal regions as the main security 
force. The T-Craft is the primary target of this vessel. When a T-Craft is detected, the 




attack the T-Craft. If the patrol force encounters the LCS, its secondary target, the patrol 
craft will continue in the attack. The detection range of this vessel is 20 nm and the 
classification range is 15 nm. 
b. Swarm 
 
The swarm boat in the Malaysia scenario is modeled after the Pilipino 
FELIX APOLINARIO patrol boat. The boats patrol very close to the shoreline looking 
for weak targets. The T-Craft is the primary target of this vessel. When a T-Craft is 
detected, the patrol craft increases its speed from the cruising speed of 25 knots to 35 
knots in order to attack the T-Craft. The swarm craft has a personality setting to come 
together (swarm) as they attack the T-Craft. If the swarm force encounters the LCS, they 
will evade and return to a safe location. Once the LCS leaves the area the swarm crafts 
begin to patrol again. The detection and classification range of this vessel is 20 nm. 
B. BLUE FORCES 
With the exception of the T-Craft, blue force data was obtained from Jane’s 
Fighting Ships 2005 – 2006 (2005). 
1. T-Craft 
 
The T-Craft has the mission of transporting sustainment ashore. As the T-Craft 
encounters enemy forces, it will attempt to evade the threat. When the T-Craft encounters 
enemy patrol boats, the T-Craft will speed up in an attempt to outrun the enemy force. 
The T-Craft is also prone to stay close to other friendly forces in hostile territory. In 
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contrast, when semi-submersibles are encountered, the T-Craft will slow down in an 
attempt to destroy the threat or maneuver around it. The speed of the T-Craft is varied by 
the NOLH and its detection and classification range is 20 nm.  
2. Littoral Combat Ships 
 
The Littoral Combat ship surface package has the primary mission of providing 
security for the T-Craft. The LCS_SW patrols at 20 knots to and from the shore. Due to 
its draft, the LCS_SW can only come within six nm of the shoreline. The primary target 
of the LCS is enemy patrol boats. Once enemy vessels are detected, the LCS_SW 
increases speed to 40 knots in order to engage and eliminate the enemy. The LCS do not 
detect the semi-submersibles that are located along the shoreline due to the constraints of 
only coming within six nm of the shore. As semi-submersibles drift out of range, the LCS 
can then detect them. Once detected, the LCS will attempt to destroy the semi-
submersible. The detection and classification range of the LCS_SW package is 30 nm. 
 
The Littoral Combat ship anti-submarine warfare package has the primary 
mission of providing security for the T-Craft. The LCS_ASW patrols at 20 knots to and 
from the shore. Due to its draft, the LCS_ASW can only come within six nm of the 
shoreline. The primary target of the LCS is enemy patrol boats. Once enemy vessels are 
detected, the LCS_ASW increases speed to 40 knots in order to engage and eliminate the 
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enemy. The LCS do not detect the semi-submersibles that are located along the shoreline 
due to the constraints of only coming within six nm of the shore. As semi-submersibles 
drift out of range, the LCS then can detect them. Once detected, the LCS will attempt to 
destroy the semi-submersible. The detection and classification range of the LCS_ASW 
package is 30 nm. 
3. Destroyer 
 
The destroyer is located at the seabase and has the primary mission of defending 
the seabase. In addition, the destroyer also provides over watch to sustainment operations 
going ashore. If an enemy vessel comes within range of the seabase or the destroyer, the 
destroyer will fire on that vessel.  
4. MH-60 
 
The MH-60 patrols the area looking for enemy threats. If the MH-60 comes in 
contact with enemy patrol craft the MH-60 will stand off until LCSs arrive. The MH-60 
does not engage the enemy patrol vessels. If the MH-60 detects the swarm or semi-
submersibles, they will attempt to destroy them with their organic weapons systems. The 
MH-60 patrols at 150 km and engages the enemy at 140 km. Its detection and 
classification range is 20 nm.   
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APPENDIX C.  MODEL DESIGNS 
A. EXPLORATORY DESIGN   
The table below lists the input ranges for the exploratory design. Controllable 
factors are in blue and noise factors are in red. The design was set up to explore the 
model and ensure its realism. This design was developed using the NOLH design and 
consisted of 18 factors and 129 design points.  
Factors  Value 
Range 
Description 
Number of T-Craft 5 – 10 Number of T-Craft in a given design run 
T-Craft Speed in 
knots 
35 – 55  T-Craft speed in a given run 
Number of 
LCS_SW 




1 – 5  Number of LCS_ASW in a given design 
run 
Number of MH-60 1 – 5  Number of MH-60 in a given design run 
T-Craft DetR 185m – 
92600m  
Detection range of the T-Craft in a given 
design run 
LCS_SW DetR 185m – 
92600m  
Detection range of the LCS_SW in a 
given design run 
LCS_ASW DetR 185m – 
92600m  
Detection range of the LCS_ASW in a 
given design run 
MH-60 DetR 185m – 
92600m 
Detection range of the MH-60 in a given 
design run 
NLOS Pk 0 – 1  Probability of kill associated with the 
NLOS weapon system  
Mk110 57mm 0 – 1  Probability of kill associated with the 
Mk110 weapon system 
30mm Pk 0 – 1  Probability of kill associated with the 
30mm weapon system 
RAM Pk 0 – 1  Probability of kill associated with the 
RAM weapon system 
.50 cal Pk 0 – 1  Probability of kill associated with the .50 
cal weapon system 
Hellfire Pk 0 – 1  Probability of kill associated with the 
Hellfire weapon system 
Torpedo Pk 0 – 1  Probability of kill associated with the 
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torpedo weapon system 
Red Patrol Boats 10 – 30  Number of red patrol boats in a given run 




0 – 463m Detection range of the semi-submersible in 
a given run 
B. PRELIMINARY DESIGN 
Once adjustments were made to the model, a preliminary design was developed to 
further explore the simulation model. The preliminary design was created to provide a 
more detailed look at each scenario after the refinement of the exploratory design. This 




Number of T-Craft  5 - 11 Number of T-Craft in a given design 
run 
Active Weapon  1,2, 3(Both) Weapon used in a given design run 
T-Craft Speed in knots 20 – 55  T-Craft speed in a given run 
LCS_SW 1 – 30  Number of LCS_SW in a given 
design run 
LCS_ASW 1 – 5  Number of LCS_ASW in a given 
design run 
Destoryer 1 – 3  Number of Destroyer in a given 
design run 
MH-60 1 - 10 Number of MH-60 in a given design  
Mk110 57mm Pk  0.5 – 1  Probability of kill associated with the 
MK110 
30mm Pk 0.5 – 1  Probability of kill associated with the 
30mm 




0 – 5  Number of semi-submersibles in a 
given design run 
Swarm (Malaysia 
scenario) 
5 – 15  Number of swarm boats in a given 
design run 
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C. FIRST STAGE DESIGN 
The table below lists the input ranges for the design addressing the first question 
in this thesis. The design was set up to explore the different combinations of the T-Craft 
being armed, unarmed, escorted, and not escorted. The default escort setting in this model 
is: five LCS_SW, two LCS_ASW, two Destroyers, and four MH-60s. 
Factor  Value 
Range  
Description 
Number of T-Craft 5 – 11 The number of T-Craft in a given 
design run 
T-Craft Armed 0, 1  Binary variable to set the weapons on 
(1) or off (0)  
Alt Waypoint 0, 1  TTP for the T-Craft: (0) – T-Craft 
goes to shore; (1) T-Craft returns to 
seabase 
Escorts Vessels 0, 1  Determines if the T-Craft is escorted 
in a given run.  
(1) – yes; (0) - no  
T-Craft Speed in knots 20 – 55 T-Craft speed varies for each design 
run  
Red Patrol Boats 5 – 15  The number of red patrol boats in a 
given design run 
Red-semisubmersibles 
(Colombia scenario) 
0 – 5 The number of semi-submersibles in a 
given design run 
Swarm (Malaysia 
scenario) 
0 – 15 The number of swarm boats in a given 
design run 
  
Below is the correlation matrix and scatter plot of the Colombia first stage design, 
which shows the filling properties of the NOLH. Factors are listed along the diagonal.  
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Below is the correlation matrix and scatter plot of the Malaysia first stage design, 
which shows the filling properties of the NOLH. Factors are listed along the diagonal. 
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D. SECOND STAGE DESIGN  
The second stage of the design was set up to determine the best employment 
method of the T-Craft. The stage two design consisted of 11 factors and 513 design 






Number of T-Craft  5 - 11 Number of T-Craft in a given 
design run 
Active Weapon  1, 2, 3 (Both) Weapon used in a given design 
run 
T-Craft Speed in knots 20 – 55  T-Craft speed in a given design 
run 
LCS_SW 1 – 10  Number of LCS_SW in a given 
design run 
LCS_ASW 1 – 5  Number of LCS_ASW in a given 
design run 
Destoryer 1 – 3  Number of Destroyer in a given 
design run 
MH-60 1 - 10 Number of MH-60 in a given 
design run 
Mk110 57mm Pk  0.5 – 1  Probability of kill associated with 
the MK110 
30mm Pk 0.5 – 1  Probability of kill associated with 
the 30mm 
Red Patrol  0 - 10 Number of red patrol boats in a 
given design run 
Semi-submersible  
(Colombia scenario) 
0 – 5  Number of semi-submersibles in a 
given design run 
Swarm (Malaysia 
scenario) 
0 – 15  Number of swarm boats in a given 
design  
The figure below shows the correlation matrix and scatter plots of the Malaysia 
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